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ROLE-BASED POLICING:
RESTRAINING POLICE CONDUCT 
“OUTSIDE THE LEGITIMATE INVESTIGATIVE SPHERE”
Eric J.  Miller*
ABSTRACT 
The last quarter of a century has produced a growing legitimacy crisis in the 
criminal justice system arising from profound and familiar differences in race and 
class.  The same tactics used to win the War on Crime also harassed and intimidated 
the very people policing was supposed to protect, sending disproportionate numbers 
of young minority men and women to prison as part of War On Drugs.   
 
In this article, I take up challenge of social norms theorists who advocate 
empowering police and local communities through a variety of traditional and newly 
minted public order offenses.  My claim is that the sort of preventative policing they 
advocate, singling out quality of life issues, can and should be separated from 
reactive investigative policing directed at apprehending criminals.  The police, as 
currently constituted, are simply the wrong people to engage in preventative policing.  
My proposal is to radically restructure the manner in which we think about the 
legitimacy of various policing practices and the type of authority wielded by the 
police.  The rule-based attempt to limit police authority through prospective 
constitutional (and other) norms limiting their ability to search, seize, and 
interrogate suspects does not work to constrain their ability to police public order 
and engage in crime prevention.  Instead, I propose a series of role-based constraints 
of the scope of police authority.   
 
Much like the separation-of-powers limitation upon the various branches of 
government, role-based constraints suggest that municipalities should match the 
authority conferred upon particular government officials to the specific problems to 
be addressed through public order policing.  The appropriate local authorities 
include bus drivers and crossing guards: municipal officials with no power to engage 
in investigation but who have the authority to enforce norms of public order.  Such 
officials possess limited institutional legitimacy outside of their various spheres of 
operation and no role-based authority to engage in the invasive, investigative 
policing practices currently utilized in predominantly urban areas. 
 
* I am indebted for their interest in and comments upon this article to a number of people: 
Professors Jamison E. Colburn, Arthur Leavens, and Anne B. Goldstein at Western New 
England College School of Law, Professors Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. and Heather K. Gerken at 
Harvard Law School, Professor G. Jack Chin at the University of Arizona Law School, 
Professor Elaine Chiu at St. John’s Law School, Professor Camille Nelson at St. Louis Law 
School, and  Benjamin Wizner of the ACLU, for their insightful comments; the faculty of 
Western New England Law School, the University of Cincinnati Law School, and St. Louis 
Law School for comments on an earlier draft of this article, and Professor Randall L. 
Kennedy who inspired much of my thinking in connection with this paper. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nothing we say today is to be taken as indicating 
approval of police conduct outside the legitimate 
investigative sphere. Under our decision, courts 
still retain their traditional responsibility to guard 
against police conduct which is over-bearing or 
harassing, or which trenches upon personal 
security without the objective evidentiary 
justification which the Constitution 
requires. … And, of course, our approval of 
legitimate and restrained investigative conduct 
undertaken on the basis of ample factual 
justification should in no way discourage the 
employment of other remedies than the 
exclusionary rule to curtail abuses for which that 
sanction may prove inappropriate. 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968) 
Despite the many strides made in sharply reducing the rate of violent crime, 
the last quarter of a century has produced a growing legitimacy crisis in the 
criminal justice system.1 That the crisis is not experienced in a uniform 
manner across all segments of our society is not a cause for complacency, but 
an additional source of concern.  Put simply, whether or not you regard the 
techniques and targets of policing as well chosen depends in part upon 
profound and familiar differences of race, political affiliation, and place of 
residence.2 Most intriguingly, a lack of uniformity among racial, political, and 
geographical groups only adds to the confusion.3
A central paradox of the War on Crime is that the means by which it 
triumphed alienated those it was intended to liberate.  Increased policing of 
urban communities has, by at least one measure, resoundingly succeeded: 
serious crime is down everywhere.4 Nonetheless, many of those concerned 
 
1 See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT — RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 4-
5 (1995); compare Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Twenty-Seventh Annual Review of 
Criminal Procedure—Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 
1153, 1160-66 (1998) (hereinafter Kahan & Meares, Crisis). 
2 See TONRY, supra note 1, at 4-5; compare William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1871, 1875-76 (2000) (hereinafter Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes); William J. Stuntz, 
Race, Class, And Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1801-3, 1813-15 (1998) (hereinafter 
Stuntz, Race, Class & Drugs). 
3 See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW  (1998) (hereinafter KENNEDY, RACE 
& CRIME); Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination:  A 
Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1270-76 (1994) (hereinafter Kennedy, State & Criminal 
Law). 
4 See, e.g. Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence 
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing 
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with racial disparities in policing have pointed out that the same tactics used to 
win the War on Crime have also served to harass and intimidate the very 
people such policing was supposed to protect.5 Policing may be working, but 
at what cost? 
 
The debate over the appropriate manner of policing urban, minority 
communities has riven the liberal criminal law community.6 In particular, 
liberal legal theorists7 have clashed with the relatively liberal proponents of 
economic or administrative approaches to law — who I shall broadly call 
social norms theorists8 — over policing public order. The heart of that debate 
 
New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 329-331 (1998) (citing Jeffrey Fagan et al., Declining 
Homicide in New York City: A Tale of Two Trends, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (1998); 
Richard Curtis, The Improbable Transformation of Inner City Neighborhoods: Crime, 
Violence, Drugs and Use in the 1990's, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (1998); Dan M. 
Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 369 (1997) 
(hereinafter Kahan, Social Meaning). 
5 See TONRY, supra note 1; Paul Butler, The Evil of American Criminal Justice: A Reply, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 143, 154 (1996); David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment 
on Randall Kennedy's “Politics of Distinction,” 83 GEO. L.J. 2547 (1995) (hereinafter Cole, 
Paradox of Race and Crime); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1-55 (1999) (hereinafter COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE).  
See also Tracey L. Meares, Place And Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 680 (1998) 
(hereinafter Meares, Place And Crime). 
6 Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 684-94 (critiquing the race-based analyses of Paul 
Butler and of Angela Davis) (citing Butler, supra note 5, at 154; Paul Butler, Affirmative 
Action and the Criminal Law, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 841, 884 (1997) (hereinafter Butler,
Affirmative Action); Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the 
Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995) (hereinafter Butler, Jury Nullification); 
Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1997); Angela 
Jordan Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 13 (1998)).  Compare KENNEDY, RACE & CRIME, supra note 3 with Paul Butler, 
(Color) Blind Faith: The Tragedy of Race, Crime, and the Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1270 
(1998); compare Kennedy, State & Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 1270-76 with Cole, 
Paradox of Race and Crime, supra note 5. 
7 When discussing legal liberalism I mean to follow William H. Simon’s use of the term.  See 
William H. Simon, Solving Problems v. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to 
Liberal Legalism (August 1, 2003 version), unpublished manuscript at 7-10 (describing 
liberal legal theorists as subscribing to a “victim perspective… fundamentally concerned with 
the needs of the wounded and vulnerable” and a “commitment to formulating certain 
fundamental norms as…analytical, individualistic, categorical, judicially enforceable, and 
corrective…[r]ights…derived analytically by the application of legal reasoning to 
authoritative sources”). 
8 These social norms theories have been variously described as “legal pragmatism,” see 
Simon, supra note 7, at 48-74; “norm focused scholarship,” see Bernard E. Harcourt, After 
the “Social Meaning Turn”: Implications for Research Design and Methods of Proof in 
Contemporary Criminal Law Policy Analysis, 34 L. & SOC'Y REV. 179, 179 (2000); Tracey 
L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms Of) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 805, 806 (1998) (hereinafter Meares & Kahan, Norms); the “New Chicago School,” see 
Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998); and the “new 
discretion scholars,” David Cole, Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A
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concerns the best means by which to ensure quality of life in urban minority 
communities while avoiding sending young Black and Latino men and 
(increasingly) women to prison as part of War On Drugs.9
In this article, I take up challenge of social norms theorists who advocate 
empowering police and local communities through a variety of traditional and 
newly minted public order offenses as means of attacking high crime in urban 
and predominantly minority neighborhoods.10 My claim is that the sort of 
preventative policing they advocate, singling out public order or quality of life 
issues, can and should be separated from reactive investigative policing 
directed at apprehending criminals.  Given such a separation of prevention and 
investigation, the police, as currently constituted, are the wrong people to 
engage in preventative policing.  Instead, the appropriate people include meter 
readers, bus drivers, and crossing guards: municipal officials with no power to 
engage in investigation but who have the authority to enforce norms of public 
order. 
 
My proposal is to radically restructure the manner in which we think about the 
legitimacy of various policing practices and the type of authority wielded by 
the police.  Our current focus on constitutional remedies for low-level police 
abuses has failed to ameliorate the legitimacy crisis faced by the police and the 
justified resentment expressed by individuals and local communities subject to 
heightened amounts of policing that is taking increasingly invasive forms. 
 
The attempt to limit police authority through prospective constitutional (and 
other) norms limiting their ability to search, seize, and interrogate suspects is 
properly confined to the police’s investigative role.  It does not work to 
constrain their ability to police public order and engage in crime prevention.  
Yet even at the investigative stage, the Court has already replaced the rule-
based due-process model of authority11 with a series of role-based exceptions 
to the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ constitutional requirements.   
 
Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1062 (1999) 
(herinafter Cole, Discretion). 
9 See Stuntz, Race, Class & Drugs, supra note 2 at 1836. 
10 See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 191, 223-24 (1998) (herinafter Meares, Social Organization) (curfew; anti-
loitering ordinance; reverse sting); Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 699 (curfew; 
anti-loitering ordinance); Tracey L. Meares, It's a Question Of Connections, 31 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 579, 593 (1997) (hereinafter Mears, Connections) (curfew; anti-loitering ordinance); 
Kahan & Meares, Crisis, supra note 1 (curfews, gang- loitering, laws, order-maintenance 
policing); Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment,
1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261 (1998) (hereinafter Livingston, Caretaking); Debra Livingston, 
Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts Communities, and the New 
Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997) (hereinafter Livingston, Communities). 
11 Exemplified by the warrant requirement and a strong reading of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments. 
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Role-based conceptions of the scope of authority do not fit with an emphasis 
on due process, the warrant requirement, and prospective limits on the power 
to police.12 Much like the separation-of-powers limitation upon the various 
branches of government, they work to suggest that municipalities should 
match the scope of authority conferred upon particular government officials to 
the specific set of problems to be addressed through public order policing.  
These include vandalism, loitering, noisiness, “cruising,” and solicitation, and 
are particularly problematic insofar as they are indicia of drug crime and gang 
activity.13 A range of municipal officials other than the police can address 
many of these activities.  Such officials possess limited institutional legitimacy 
outside of their various spheres of operation and no role-based authority to 
engage in the invasive, investigative policing practices currently utilized in 
predominantly urban areas. 
 
The distinction between rule- and role-based policing helps illuminate some 
troubling features of the public-order policing debate.  Currently that 
discussion revolves around the propriety of endorsing an increase in the 
“discretion” devolved upon law-enforcement officers.  I suggest that focus on 
“discretion” alone — from both sides of the debate — is mistaken, not because 
police (should) have or lack discretion, but because social norms scholars, 
properly understood, do not wish to give police “discretion.”  Rather, they 
propose a different source of constraint — local supervision and “social 
norms” — premised upon conceptions of police authority, professionalism, 
and legitimacy that diverge markedly from the legal liberal model.  Once the 
normative (as opposed to sociological)14 basis for police authority and 
legitimacy is laid bare, it turns out that the debate is over different conceptions 
of (constrained) police autonomy, and the solution to problems of policing is 
not police discretion but the police role. 
 
12 See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1738 
(2005) (“Warrants, in fact, were the principal motif of the Warren Court's approach to the 
Fourth Amendment.  … Again and again, the Court insisted that, with certain narrow 
exceptions, searches and seizures were reasonable only if the police obtained ‘advance 
judicial approval’ in the form of a warrant. The point was that judges should decide, not 
police officers.”). 
13 See Meares, Social Organization, supra note 10, at 223; Kahan & Meares, Crisis, supra note 
1; Meares, Connections, supra note 10, at 593; Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering, the Court, 
and Some Realism About Police Patrol, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 141 (1999); Livingston, 
Communities, supra note 10. 
14 See Michael S. Moore, Three Concepts of Rules, 14 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 772, 773-
75, 777-78 (1991).  See also Brian Bix, H.L.A. Hart and the Hermeneutic Turn in Legal 
Theory, 52 SMU L. Rev. 167, 193 (1999) (discussing “sociological or psychological 
exploration on why people treat legal rules as giving them reasons for actions.”) (citing TOM 
R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990)). 
ROLE-BASED POLICING 
5
In Section II, I place the social norms theorists descriptive (empirical or 
sociological) account of community perceptions of legal legitimacy into a 
normative framework.15 The ability of legal officials to govern depends upon 
the assimilation of legal directives into the local social norms structuring an 
agent’s choices.16 In the criminal law, social perceptions of legal legitimacy 
depend upon the manner in which rational agents understand and internalize 
criminal sanctions as part of their general attitude towards other, legal and 
non-legal, norms of conduct.17 At the very least, that people endorse a set of 
norms tells us an interesting fact — what system of norms is in force in a 
given community and so how to tailor new or existing norms to make them 
more efficient.18 That sociological fact does not, however, tell us whether 
those norms ought to form the basis of a moral, political, or legal theory.19 
Descriptive elaboration of local norms does not encompass the full scope of 
the social norms theorists’ ambitions: despite the empirical, rational-choice the 
nature of much of their argument, they want to discuss not just the appearance 
of legitimacy, but actual legitimacy.  Their normative claim is that social 
norms provide justified, substantively legitimate reasons upon which we ought 
to rely independent of the claim made by either the authority or the norm-
subjects20 — a set of “politically feasible and morally attractive” policies.21 
The disagreement between social norms and liberal legal theories rests upon 
the attractiveness of the normative claim.  
 
In order to understand the scope of the social norms theorists political and 
moral program, it is essential to elaborate the concepts of legitimacy and 
authority that underlie the discussion.  Accordingly, in Section III I provide a 
definition of these concepts, as well as introducing the concepts of rule- and 
role-based authority.  Each concerns the proper scope of legitimate authority: 
rule-based authority has its basis in adherence to the content of particular 
 
15 Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1616 (2002) 
(hereinafter Meares, Pollicing).  See also Meares, Social Organization, supra note 10, at 214 
(compliance with norms based on agent’s internal perception of government legitimacy). 
16 See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995). 
17 See id. at 1006. 
18 See Moore, supra note 14, at 773-75, 777-78.  See also Bix, supra note 14, at 193 
(discussing “sociological or psychological exploration on why people treat legal rules as 
giving them reasons for actions.”) (citing TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 
(1990)). 
19 Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 181, 265-67 (2004); Moore, 
supra note 14, at 773-75, 777-78. 
20 The concepts of legitimacy and justification are normative; they entail a particular, internal 
attitude on the part of the law’s subjects.  See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Three Objections to the 
Use of Empiricism in Criminal Law and Procedure—And Three Answers, 2002 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 851, 864-65 (2002) (hereinafter Meares, Empiricism); Meares, Place & Crime, supra 
note 5, at 670-80. 
21 Harcourt, supra note 7, at 179. 
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rules; role-based in the powers afforded individuals occupying a particular 
status in specified circumstances or jurisdictions.  These different justifications 
for the scope of legitimate authority explain some of the features of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine and the tendency of the Court’s jurisprudence to 
“lurch[ ]” between competing visions of the scope of justified authority.22 
My central concern is with the legitimacy crisis in policing urban, minority 
communities and the social norms response to that crisis.  Section IV contains 
a statement of the problem and a discussion of the legal liberal and social 
norms responses to it.  Minority communities face the paradox of under- and 
over-policing.23 Differential rates of arrest, prosecution, conviction, and 
length of sentencing has resulted in a vastly disproportionate number of 
minority drug users sent to prison, with a devastating effect upon the human 
resources in their communities.24 Drug dealing and gang activity, however, 
impose significant burdens on the community, often resulting in a break-down 
of public order and a rise in violent crime and property damage that curtails 
the quality of life in afflicted neighborhoods.  The legal liberal emphasis on 
the rights of criminal defendants and constitutionally mandated controls upon 
the police does little to ameliorate the plummeting quality of life experience by 
urban residents; the legal liberal emphasis on race, poverty and crime fails to 
account for differences in criminality experienced by communities with 
similar racial and economic profiles.25 Social norms theorists’ claim they can 
explain local differences and raise the quality of life through neighborhood 
attitudes to government legitimacy. 
 
In Section V, I demonstrate that the social norms project of delegating power 
to the police ironically requires more, not less, legislation and the creation of 
new, government-generated, rather than local, standards of criminality.  Social 
norms theorists attempt to legitimate these increased police powers by 
involving community members in the process of norm creation.26 This 
solution stems from a failure clearly to understand the nature of police 
authority and the consequences of removing the few due-process restraints 
upon the operation of that authority in the community setting.  What is 
required is not more police discretion, but a preventative, public order policing 
authority limited to that role and precluded by inclination and institutional 
 
22 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ((“our 
jurisprudence [has] lurched back and forth between imposing a categorical warrant 
requirement and looking to reasonableness alone.”). 
23 See Kennedy, State & Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 1255-56. 
24 See Michael Tonry, Toward a Rational Drug Policy: Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 25, 52 (1994). 
25 See Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 675-81. 
26 Meares & Kahan, Norms, supra note 8, at 827; see also Meares, Social Organization, supra 
note 10, at 220-26  (discussing reverse stings and anti-gang ordinances); Meares, Policing, 
supra note 15, at 1612 (same). 
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competence from engaging in the type of policing that generates alienation and 
resentment from the very groups that are supposed to benefit from an increase 
in order.   
 
Police trained to use public order legislation as collateral means of engaging in 
investigation and detecting drug crime inevitably go beyond public order 
policing when empowered by youth curfew, anti-gang, or anti-cruising laws to 
control the mostly minority urban communities that are the prime targets of 
public order policing.27 The result is a form of high-stakes policing in which 
low-level encounters rapidly escalate into stops, searches, and seizures and in 
which possession of small amounts of low-level drugs result in lengthy prison 
sentences.  The style and consequences of policing often results in a public 
perception of institutional illegitimacy, where the minority, urban community 
internalizes the style and consequences of policing as race-based and racist.28 
In Section VI, I conclude that, given the point and purpose of public order 
policing, it is not clear that the police are the proper body to accomplish them.  
Community participation in policing — and the crime-control goals touted by 
“broken windows” policing — should work at least as effectively (from the 
perspective of community participation, more effectively) if public officials 
with a more limited institutional role undertake public order policing. 
 
Intriguingly, such targeting does not involve statutes directed against youth, 
gangs, or drug dealers: public order offenses are only tangentially related to 
these activities. Where groups of young people are orderly and where low-
level drugs are distributed non-violently and in private houses we are often not 
concerned to police them.  Experience shows that there is widespread public 
tolerance for low-end drug use so long as that use is private and the 
community remains orderly. In addition, generally communities not only 
tolerate but demand low sentences for public order offenses.  Accordingly, the 
officials empowered to stop, search, and arrest should not be those engaged in 
public order policing, and who are trained to use any encounter as a 
justification for initiating collateral, investigative policing as part of the 
investigation of low-level drug crime in urban communities.  These 
considerations argue in favor of redeploying police away from public order 
policing and into the more labor-intensive activity of investigating crimes of 
violence and dealing dangerous drugs. 
 
27 See Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering, the Court, and Some Realism About Police Patrol,
1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 141, 173 (1999). 
28 See Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 680; Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy 
and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 413-14 (2000) (hereinafter, Meares, Legitimacy 
& Law). 
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II. SANCTION- AND NORM-BASED THEORIES OF CRIMINAL LAW
Social norms theories share a distinctive approach to legal analysis, one that is 
empirical and contextual,29 concerned to examine non-legal, informal systems 
of social regulation.  The empirical ambition of the theory is to discover what 
government rules and standards people endorse and discern public perceptions 
of legitimacy as measured by observable reactions to social and legal norms.30 
The social emphasis of the theory is to insist that lay-persons’ conduct is 
motivated by non-legal standards even when the law purports to control their 
behavior.31 The normative aspect regards social agents as rational beings 
capable of directing their conduct by reference to norms.32 So while social 
norms theorists consider that the law is an institution able to create obligations 
that are internalized by subjects, they attempt to determine the manner in 
which a rational agent will understand and internalize the sanction as part of 
their general attitude towards other, legal and non-legal, norms of conduct.33 
The concept of “internalization” helps explain the relation between empirical 
and normative theories and the distinctive, sanction-minimizing character of 
the “new” policing. 
 
A. Internal and External Norms
Social norms theories attempt to determine the manner in which a rational 
agent will understand and internalize criminal sanctions as part of his or her 
general attitude towards other, legal and non-legal, norms of conduct.34 The 
social-norms perspective gives weight to the meaning that agents and social 
groups place upon legal norms35 and, so the social-norms theorists claim, 
mediates individual assessments of value.36 Accordingly, such theories seek to 
identify the effect of both the direct threat to impose sanctions and the indirect 
 
29 See, e.g., Meares, Empiricism, supra note 20.. 
30 See Meares, Legitimacy & Law, supra note 28, at 413-14. 
31 See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 338, 351 (1997).  The law guides conduct by providing “general standards of 
conduct, which multitudes of individuals could understand, without further direction, as 
requiring from them certain conduct when occasion arose.”  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW at 121 (1st ed.).  
32 See, e.g., Steven J. Burton, Law as Practical Reason, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 747 (1989); 
Neil MacCormick, Norms, Institutions, and Institutional Fact, 17 L. & PHIL. 301, 322-24 
(1990). 
33 See Lessig, supra note 16, at 1006. 
34 See id.
35 See, e.g., HART, supra note 31, at 55-6 (1st ed. 1990); NEIL MACCORMICK, H. L. A. HART 
30-34 (1981).  For a sociological perspective on the internal attitude to rules (phrased in terms 
of “context” and “contingency”) see Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181, 2181-83 (1996). 
36 See, e.g., Kahan, Social Meaning, supra note 4, at 359-60. 
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assimilation of such legal directives into the social norms structuring and 
agent’s choices.37 
A distinctive feature of the “social meaning” of norms is (in normative terms) 
the agent’s “internal” point of view.38 The internal point of view explains the 
agent’s particular orientation towards the rule, her “critical reflective attitude” 
towards behavior described or justified with regard to that rule.39 From the 
internal point of view, norms operate as criteria for the agent’s judgments 
governing her decisions about what to do.  From the internal point of view, the 
norm motivates and justifies conforming behavior.40 Agents manifest the 
internal point of view by pointing to the various reasons for following norms 
to explain, critique, or justify conduct and would do so even in the absence of 
a sanction.41 
What is essential to this critical attitude is that the agent accept the norms 
structuring the practice as providing a standard of judgment against which 
such statements can be compared, critiqued, and justified using such concepts 
as “‘ought,’ ‘must,’ and ‘should,’ ‘right’ and ‘wrong.’”42 Without the internal 
attitude to the rule (or norm or authority) the concepts of obligation, 
justification, and legitimacy are absent from any explanation of our behavior 
in conformity with the rule, and the particular type of obligation imposed 
remains opaque.43 The normative account, therefore, can explain why people 
obey the law and demand conformity from others even when they do not 
believe the sanction will be imposed.  The contribution of social norm 
theorists to the analysis of the criminal law may be represented as a move from 
external to internal understandings of the structure of such choices, from an 
emphasis on outcomes to social meanings.44 
The distinction between internal and external points of view, long familiar to 
philosophers of law, is a central plank of the social norms critique of the “old-
 
37 See Lessig, supra note 16. 
38 See, e.g., HART, supra note 31, at 55-6; MACCOMICK, supra note 35 AT 30-35.  
39 MACCOMICK, supra note 35 at 30-35.  HART, supra note 31, at 54-56. 
40 For motivational accounts of the law, see Scott J. Shapiro, The Difference that Rules Make 
in ANALYZING LAW: NEW ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 33, 37 (Brian Bix, ed., 1998) 
(hereinafter Shapiro, Rules); Scott J. Shapiro, On Hart's Way Out, in ESSAYS ON THE 
POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 149, 173 (Jules Coleman, ed. 2001) (hereinafter 
Shapiro, Hart); See, e.g., Jules Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the 
Practical Difference Thesis, in ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 99, 122 
(Jules Coleman, ed. 2001). 
41 H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory (1982). 
42 HART, supra note 31, at 56.  Hart refers to these terms as part of our “general normative 
terminology.” 
43 Id.
44 See Lessig, supra note 16, at 1006.  See also Meares & Kahan, Norms, supra note 8, at 809-
815. 
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style” economic analysis of law.45 Consider, as an example of the external 
perspective, Richard Posner’s economic analysis of the criminal law.  Posner’s 
theory is expressly sanction-based.  He claims that the criminal law seeks to 
enforce market interactions by making extra-market transactions so costly that 
they are unaffordable.46 For a range of criminals, especially the poor, 
monetary sanctions may insufficiently deter market-avoiding transactions.47 
Accordingly, the state is justified in turning to incarceration given the cost of 
deterring, detecting, and punishing crime.48 
For Posner, the criminal law provides the public with “prudential” reasons for 
compliance with its dictates — a wish to avoid the sanction.  The potential 
criminal need not agree with the rule or regard it as justified or formally or 
substantively legitimate in order to obey it.  Rather, the rule provides 
information that enables the rational potential criminal to modify her behavior 
based upon the likelihood and quantity of punishment.49 But Posner’s theory 
fails to provide a means of distinguishing between a punishment for engaging 
in prohibited behavior and a tax levying funds for engaging in permitted 
behavior.50 As Posner notes, the fine is a penalty consequent to a finding of 
legal accountability in either criminal or tort law.51 The difference between 
the two, however, resides not so much in the relative ability to pay but in the 
“social meaning” of the penalty: how the penalty is understood by participants 
in the practice.   
 
In the criminal law, the fine is a sanction or punishment imposed upon a 
finding of legal culpability and is generally regarded to justify strong moral 
disapproval of the act engaged upon. In the civil law, the fine constitutes 
damages imposed upon a finding of liability and may entail no moral 
significance whatsoever.52 Where Posner does discuss the stigmatic effect of 
 
45 Kahan, Social Meaning, supra note 4, at 350; Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the 
Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 610 (1998). 
46 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1193, 1195-1204 (1985); see also RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 
2003).  
47 See Posner, supra note 46, at 1204-05. 
48 See id. at 1205-14. 
49 Such reasons are “epistemic”: they provide information that may help the process of 
practical reasoning by stating the consequences of certain options.  See Shapiro, Hart, supra 
note 40, at 173. 
50 See H.L.A. Hart has emphasized the normative significance of the distinction between “an 
act which is legally obligatory and punishable, from conduct which is subjected to a tax or 
other painful or disagreeable administrative measures.”  HART, supra note 41, at 133-34. 
51 See Posner, supra note 46, at 1205-14. 
52 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 
B.U. L. REV. 201, 205-06 (1996) (same); Paul H. Robinson, Foreword: The Criminal-Civil 
Distinction and Dangerous Blameless Offenders, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 693, 693-
95 (1993) (same).  
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the criminal law he presupposes moral condemnation as an additional cost to 
be factored into the rational agent’s decision process without suggesting why 
doing so would be appropriate or justified.53 To do so would require a theory 
that takes into consideration the social meaning of culpability and punishment.  
Such a theory would have to take a more or less54 internal attitude to the 
practice, and include the fact that in the criminal law the forbidden conduct is 
ruled out altogether as wrong rather than tolerated or regulated (though 
discouraged) so long as adequate compensation is made. 
 
From the perspective of social norms scholars, authority internalized as part of 
the agent’s personal morality is a “powerful normative reason for 
compliance.”55 “[T]he individual who complies for normative reasons does so 
because she feels an internal obligation to do so,” rather than on the basis of 
some external stimulus.56 As an empirical matter, in the legal context 
internalized, “legitimate” authority is particularly associated with government 
behavior and consists in “an amalgamation of perceptions that individuals hold 
of the law and authorities that enforce it.”57 The greater the popular perception 
of governmental legitimacy, the greater the likelihood of popular compliance 
with the law.58 The likelihood of compliance with a particular government 
authority is a measure of that authority’s “social influence.” 
 
The concept of “social influence” is an important one in social norms 
scholarship: I suggest it has a normative dimension.  From a normative 
perspective, an authority has “social influence” when, consciously or not, it 
possesses the power to alter an agent’s normative situation by declaring the 
agent’s actions legitimate or illegitimate, justified or not.59 Social influence is 
thus the normative power exerted by a community authority upon community 
norms.  Social norms theorists give the concept an empiricist twist; it “is the 
term that social psychologists use to describe the propensity of individuals to 
conform to the behavior and expectations of others.”60 Clearly, not just any set 
of expectations exerts an influence over an individual, so the notion of 
authority is intrinsic to the sociological concept.  School-teachers, celebrities, 
 
53 See Posner, supra note 46, at 1205-07, 1216, 1223-24. 
54 See, e.g., Bix, supra note 14, at 174; MACCOMICK, supra note 35 at 30-35. 
55 Meares, Legitimacy & Law, supra note 28, at 399; Tracey L. Meares, Signaling, 
Legitimacy, and Compliance: A Comment on Posner's Law and Social Norms and Criminal 
Law Policy, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 407, 410 (2002). 
56 Meares, Policing, supra note 15, at 1616.  See also Meares, Social Organization, supra 
note 10, at 214 (compliance with norms based on agent’s internal perception of government 
legitimacy).  
57 Meares, Legitimacy & Law, supra note 28, at 399. 
58 See Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 679. 
59 Meares & Kahan, Norms, supra note 8, at 813. 
60 Id. at 813; see also Kahan, Social Meaning, supra note 4, at 353. 
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and mentors may constitute such an authority, but so may a barber or 
beautician if their opinions carry weight in the community.61 
Because social influence concerns the number of individuals whose behavior 
an authority influences and with what strength, if we are to understand the 
force and reach of particular norms, we must have some understanding of the 
manner in which individuals guide or govern their behavior by authorities.  
Here again, the attitudes of subjects are important.  An agent might internalize 
and endorse a norm as intrinsically valuable or instrumentally legitimate and 
be motivated to act accordingly.62 The agent may act for instrumental and 
prudential or self-interested reasons, for altruistic reasons, or for no reason.63 
Perhaps the agent is governed by fear of criticism to identify as a member of a 
group;64 perhaps she does not whole-heartedly endorse the norm, or even think 
much about it.   
 
Police behavior is one influence upon the attitudes of citizens to the law.  Law 
enforcement is one “important indicator[ ] to individuals about how the 
authority in question views the group to which the evaluator perceives herself 
belonging.”65 So long as the processes are perceived as fair,66 particular 
outcomes will not undermine citizen assessments of justified law 
 
61 Social influence is likely to be greater the more easily that influence can be disseminated 
across the community.  In social norms literature, “norm-highways,” systems for the 
communication of norms to different members of the community represent the “connections, 
or social networks, among adults in a community,” the “multiple, overlapping relationships 
among a community's residents,” across which “obligations and expectations . . . are 
transfer[red].” Meares, Connections, supra note 10, at 583, 858.  These relationships include 
“friendship networks, community-wide supervision of teen peer groups, and . . . participation 
in formal organizations,” id. at 585, including churches and parent-teacher associations.  This 
network of overlapping relationships constitutes a “social infrastructure,”  Meares, Policing, 
supra note 15, at 1064; Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 676, the stability and 
robustness of which “will either facilitate or hinder the transmission of community values that 
can support law- abiding behavior.” Id. The existence and relative health of such a social 
infrastructure does not, however, indicate that the norms it transmits are ones that promote 
law-abindingness; the norms transmitted “may facilitate crime as well as prevent it.”  Meares, 
Policing, supra note 15, at 1064. 
62 See Shapiro, Rules, supra note 40, at 36.  Authorities may have different degrees of social 
influence dependant upon the range of attitudes entertained by the authorities’ subjects.  An 
individual may regard an authority as intrinsically or instrumentally valuable.  Intrinsic value 
entails that the authority is valuable in itself — it is good, just, etc.; instrumental value entails 
that it is valuable as a means to some other end — for example, it is able to coordinate 
behavior by setting rules that others will follow.  Individuals may entertain prudential or 
motivational attitudes to following instrumental authorities.  Prudential attitudes regard the 
authority as providing information about the manner in which others will react to conduct; 
motivational ones regard it as providing an independent reason for acting in a particular way.   
63 See HART, supra note 41, at 266-67. 
64 See McAdams, supra note 31, at 351. 
65 Meares, Legitimacy & Law, supra note 28, at 402-03. 
66 See Meares, Social Organization, supra note 10, at 214. 
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enforcement.67 Police practices may thus feasibly exert a great deal of positive 
or negative social influence in urban communities.  One goal of social norms 
scholarship is to analyze and develop ways of creating the conditions by which 
to increase the local police’s positive social influence and support norms of 
law-abidingness. 
 
B. Social Norms Justifications of Disparate Policing of Urban 
Communities
Some theorists, most notably Bernard Harcourt and Robert Weisberg, have 
(correctly) chosen to critique the concept of social meaning as underdeveloped 
in the social norms literature.68 I would suggest that the theory of social 
meaning in fact does double duty: it not only accounts for certain normative 
concepts (such as obligation, authority, and legitimacy), but also generates a 
sociological description of the shared beliefs of certain groups or communities 
to explain their response to legal and non-legal norms as justified or 
unjustified.   
 
Social norms theories can be read as a double-barreled critique of accepted 
understandings of criminal law scholarship.69 Such scholarship rejects the 
classic, Henry Hart-style description of the criminal law “method”:70 the belief 
that criminal law is an enterprise in governance through general “directions,”71 
addressed to norm subjects who are liable to sanction for disobedience.72 
Internal attitudes to norms explain how the criminal law can operate in the 
absence of a sanction, and helps redirect the focus of criminal law scholars on 
low-level as well as high-stakes crimes.  The new scholarship also dismisses 
 
67 Meares, Legitimacy & Law, supra note 28, at 402-03. 
68 Harcourt, supra note 7.  Harcourt criticizes the superficial construction of social meaning.  
Id. at 180-84.  For a more nuanced and in-depth investigation of social meaning among gun-
using youths and gang members, see Jeffrey Fagan, Deanna L. Wilkinson, Guns, Youth 
Violence, and Social Identity in Inner Cities, 24 CRIME & JUST. 105 (1998).  Another possible 
criticism of the social norms concept of social meaning is that it has ignored the tradition of 
continental phenomenology and hermeneutics which could supply some much-needed depth.  
See Robert Weisberg, Norms and Criminal Law, and the Norms of Criminal Law 
Scholarship, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 467, 476-77 (2003) (“[social meaning] is the 
most elusive and troublesome term in this new [normative criminal law] enterprise.”  See also 
Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the Modern State: 
Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out that Baby, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 328-40 (2002).  
Anthony Honoré is the principal legal theorist in the analytic tradition explaining norms in 
terms of group membership.  See TONY HONORÉ, MAKING LAW BIND: ESSAYS LEGAL AND 
PHILOSOPHICAL (1987). 
69 See, e.g., Douglas Husak, Is the Criminal Law Important?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 261 
(2003). 
70 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 402, 403-
06 (1958). 
71 Id. at 403. 
72 Id. at 404. 
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traditional rule of law constraints on enforcement practices as improperly 
focused on law-breakers and insufficiently attentive law-abiding citizens in 
failing, high-crime communities who demand more and different policing to 
secure a decent quality of life.73 
Social norms scholars seek to shift our assessment of the criminal law’s impact 
away from criminals and onto communities generally described by some 
relatively small locality, for example “the neighborhood.”74 Social norms 
scholars focus on insiders rather than outsiders;75 law-abiders rather than law 
breakers;76 public order issues rather than major crimes;77 and local 
experimentation rather than centralized standards.78 They tend to emphasize 
discretion rather than legalism and rule-of-law issues.79 A central claim is that 
the inclusion of certain shared, local norms in the policing calculus is 
sufficient to justify enforcement practices.  Police sensitivity to social norms 
justifies the rejection of broad checks on their discretion and empowers urban 
communities able to participate in criminal legislation and enforcement.80 
Social norms theories are especially powerful in explaining urban crime.  The 
norms they are interested in are social (shared by groups of people) and local 
(shared by geographically discrete communities).  Social studies reveal that 
differences in crime rates among urban communities are not explained by 
poverty or race, but by the disparate degree of social or normative cohesion 
 
73 See, e.g. Simon, supra note 7, at 7-10; 48-74; see also Kennedy, State & Criminal Law, 
supra note 3, at 1255-56. 
74 See, e.g. Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: 
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997); Meares & 
Kahan, Norms, supra note 8; Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5. 
75 Harcourt, supra note 7. 
76 Meares, Connections, supra note 10, at 593 (describing the use of curfews and anti-
loitering ordinances to isolate lawbreakers from law-abiders). 
77 Tracey L. Meares, Terry and the Relevance of Politics, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1343, 1347 
(1998); Meares, Social Organization, supra note 10, at 224. 
78 Meares, supra note 77, at 1348-49; Meares, Social Organization, supra note 10, at 224; 
Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5. 
79 For a general discussion of social norms theories, see Simon, supra note 7, at 21-26; 47-71; 
For a bibliography of these theories, see id. at 6 n.4. 
80 See, e.g. Livingston, supra note 74; Meares & Kahan, Norms, supra note 8; Kahan & 
Meares, Crisis, supra note 1.  Empowered participation as feature of “democratic 
experimentalism” more generally; see Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of 
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. 
Sabel, DRUG TREATMENT COURTS AND EMERGENT EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNMENT, 53
VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000); Archon Fung, Beyond and Below the New Urbanism: Citizen 
Participation and Responsive Spatial Reconstruction, 28 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 615, 
618-623 (2001) (hereinafter Fung, Beyond & Below); Archon Fung, Accountable Autonomy: 
Toward Empowered Deliberation in Chicago Schools and Policing, 29 POLITICS & SOC. 75-
103 (2001). 
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existing in the disparate communities.81 Where community members share 
social norms that promote law-abiding behavior and are transmitted through 
local institutions, perceptions of government legitimacy are high and crime 
rates are low.82 Where the community shares few norms or local institutions 
for transmitting them, social cohesion and perceptions of government 
legitimacy breaks down and crime rises.83 The distinctive claim of social 
norms theorists, then, is that the manner in which crime rates vary from 
locality to locality depends upon the degree of normative cohesion within the 
community rather than on the traditional indicia of wealth, class, or race.84 
Even in poor, urban, predominantly lower class and minority neighborhoods, 
norms theorists identify the most significant predictor of community 
criminality as the normative dissonance or cohesion of the various 
communities.85 
There are a variety of potential sources for normative dissonance, but three in 
particular stand out in the criminal law literature: the fragmentation of norms; 
apathy towards or the outright rejection of the government as a source of 
legality; and the government’s active signaling of an anti-community stance.86 
The problem is not normatively cohesive communities, whether antagonistic 
or not.  Because “[l]egitimacy… is rather uniquely in government control,”87 
the government can evaluate and control public perception of its behavior by 
the way in which “the legal process, in both its formal and informal aspects, 
signals to members of a social group how their group is perceived by 
 
81 See Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbush, & Felton Earls, Neighborhoods and 
Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918 (1997) 
(hereinafter, Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, Neighborhoods); Robert J. Sampson, & W. 
Byron Groves, Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social Disorganization Theory, 94 
AMERICAN J. OF SOCIOLOGY 774-802 (1989); Robert J. Sampson, & Dawn Jeglum Bartusch, 
Legal Cynicism and  (Subcultural?) Tolerance of Deviance: Neighborhood Context of Racial 
Differences, 32 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 777-804 (1998); Robert J. Sampson, & Janet Lauritsen, 
Violent Victimization and Offending: Individual-, Situational-, and Community-Level Risk 
Factors, in A. REISS & J. A. ROTH, EDS., UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE:
SOCIAL INFLUENCES (1994); Robert J. Sampson, & William Julius Wilson Toward a Theory 
of Race, Crime, and Urban Inequality, in J. HAGAN & R. PETERSON, ED., CRIME AND 
INEQUALITY (1995).  These articles are cited in Meares & Kahan, Norms, supra note 8; 
Kahan & Meares, Crisis, supra note 1. 
82 Meares, Policing, supra note 15, at 1606; Meares, Social Organization, supra note 10, at 
224; Meares, Connections, supra note 10, at 591-92. 
83 Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 675; Meares, Connections, supra note 10, at 581. 
84 Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 675-81. 
85 Id. 
86 id. 
87 Meares, Legitimacy & Law, supra note 28, at 399.  See also Lessig, supra note 8, at 665 
(noting that new Chicago school rejects idea that law is of marginal significance to social 
control). 
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governmental authorities.”88 For social norms scholars, the task in cohesive 
communities is to align local norms with enforcement norms so as to promote 
law-abidingness. 
 
The problem, both empirically and normatively, is community fragmentation: 
the lack of any “common values”89 sufficient to establish “cohesive” standards 
of conduct transmitted across shared “social networks.”90 Fragmented 
communities are distinguished by a lack of “[c]ollective supervision over and 
personal responsibility for neighborhood problems”;91 members of the 
community embrace a “hands-off” approach to criminal behavior,92 resulting 
in a state of virtual chaos in which any and all conduct, social or anti-social, 
may be regarded as justified.93 By contrast, “[c]ohesive communities are 
better able to engage in informal social control that can lead to lower levels of 
crime than communities that are not cohesive.”  
 
A community experiences normative fragmentation when the system for 
transmitting and enforcing norms breaks down.  Two types of entity are 
implicated here: the “social infrastructure”94 comprised of intersecting 
associations between persons or organizations that enable communication of 
norms to different members of the community;95 and authoritative institutions 
with the “social influence”96 to alter or enforce social norms.  Fragmented 
communities lack the “connections, or social networks, among adults in a 
 
88 Meares, supra note 55. Perceptions of governmental legitimacy, according to the 
sociological theory, are engendered through a variety of interactions between citizen and 
state, ranging from low-level stops or searches by the police up to participation in the 
legislative process.  See, also Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 680; Meares, 
Legitimacy & Law, supra note 28, at 413-14.  Across this spectrum, the manner in which the 
government treats the citizen is extremely important for the social meaning of that encounter 
— the way in which the encounter is translated “against a background of social norms that 
define how persons who value particular goods — whether the welfare of other persons [or] 
their own honor or dignity . . .  — should behave.”  Meares & Kahan, Norms, supra note 8, at 
816. 
89 Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 673. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 See Meares, Connections, supra note 10, at 583 (discussing free-riders in social 
communities). 
93 Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 675. 
94 Meares, Policing, supra note 15, at 1064; Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 676. 
95This network of overlapping relationships constitutes a the stability and robustness of which 
“will either facilitate or hinder the transmission of community values that can support law- 
abiding behavior.”  Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 676.  
96 Kahan, Social Meaning, supra note 4, at 353 (“The concept of social influence refers to a 
pervasive and familiar phenomenon in our economic and social life: namely, that individuals 
tend to conform their conduct to that of other individuals.”); see also Meares & Kahan, 
Norms, supra note 8, at 813. 
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community,”97 the “multiple, overlapping relationships among a community's 
residents,” across which “obligations and expectations . . . are transfer[red].”98 
The solution to localized differences in crime rates, according to social norms 
theories, is increased and differential policing in communities that were 
traditionally ignored and undervalued by the police.99 The goal is to replace 
signals indicating government disinterest with those expressing government 
interest,100 and to empower law-abiders and disempower law-breakers.  
Among social norms scholars there is a degree of disagreement over 
appropriate styles of policing.  They all generally approve the sort of flexible, 
“broken windows” public order policing that comports with the community’s 
tolerance for street-level disorder — pan-handling, loitering, etc. — through 
targeting “known” disruptive individuals and places, to undermine the ability 
of anti-social influences to organize and associate.101 Debra Livingston, 
however, favors a range of civil injunctions and criminal ordinances targeted 
very precisely upon specific individuals and behaviors.102 Tracey Meares and 
Dan Kahan favor increased civility on the part of the police combined with a 
series of local laws, such as youth curfews, and police practices, such as 
reverse stings, that are inherently general and expressive of neutrality over a 
broad range of individuals. In effect social norms scholars propose a form of 
police zoning based on normative cohesiveness or dissonance, such that 
communities comparable as to race, class, and location receive highly 
disparate quantities and qualities of police attention. 
 
III. AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY, RULES AND ROLES
Social norms theories are part of the liberal reaction to the effect of the War on 
Drugs on minority communities.  The War on Drugs is directly responsible for 
the massive increase in incarceration over the last twenty years.103 Both the 
 
97 Meares, Connections, supra note 10, at 583. 
98 Id. at 585. These relationships include “friendship networks, community-wide supervision 
of teen peer groups, and . . . participation in formal organizations,” including churches and 
parent-teacher associations.  Id. 
99 See, e.g., KENNEDY, RACE & CRIME, supra note 3. 
100 See Livingston, supra note 74, at 586. 
101 See Meares, Social Organization, supra note 10, at 223; Kahan & Meares, 
Crisis, supra note 1; Meares, Connections, supra note 10, at 593. 
102 Livingston, Gang Loitering, supra note 13; Livingston, Communities, supra 
note 10. 
103 See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr ., The Burdens And Benefits Of Race In America, 25
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219, 228 n.45 (1998) (comparing disparate sentencing of blacks and 
whites for possession of same weight of cocaine); CARL T. ROWAN, THE COMING RACE WAR 
IN AMERICA: A WAKE-UP CALL 193-94 (1996) (suggesting that The war on drugs has 
disproportionately imprisoned African American men, at a terrible cost to the black 
community); Tonry, supra note 24, at 52 (charting the “foreseeable disparate impact on 
Blacks” of targeting cocaine usage).  See also Note, Winning the War on Drugs: A “Second 
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1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act and the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act104 “increased 
the tendency toward punishment,”105 first by targeting drug dealing, then by 
targeting drug users. 106 The rates of arrest and incarceration have had a 
striking effect on the prison population: “In the federal prisons…drug 
offenders constituted 22 percent of admissions in 1980, 39 percent in 1988, 
and 42 percent in 1990.”107 
The burden of arrest, prosecution, and conviction has disproportionately 
impacted African American men, at a terrible cost to the black community.108 
Most notorious among the provisions were the draconian punishments for 
possession of crack cocaine.109 Its disparate impact is felt both in the style of 
policing and in the rates of arrest, prosecution, and sentencing.110 It is 
primarily responsible for the increased rates of arrest, conviction, and 
incarceration of African and Latino Americans in the last twenty years.111 
Liberal legal and social norms theorists differ profoundly, however, in their 
characterization of acceptable policing standards.  This difference, I will 
suggest, turns on two ways of creating and limiting the scope of police 
authority: through rule-based or role-based justifications.  I shall first discuss 
two different types of authority: institutional and social.  Institutions, in the 
relevant sense, are internally related systems of norms; institutional authorities 
are those empowered by the norms of an institution to engage in 
(institutionally) specified conduct.  Social authority is simply any exercise of 
 
Chance” for Nonviolent Drug Offenders, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1485-86 (2000) (“The 
dramatic increase in African- American incarcerations has resulted from congressional 
attempts to stop the devastating epidemic of crack cocaine.”). 
104 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4231  (codified as amended 
at 21 U.S.C. §801 (1988)). 
105 William D. Mccoll, Comment: Baltimore City's Drug Treatment Court: Theory And 
Practice In An Emerging Field, 55 MD. L. REV. 467, 475 (1996).  See also DAVID GARLAND,
THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 118, 
132 (2001) (describing the War on Drugs as an event that “utterly transformed law 
enforcement in the USA”). 
106 Mccoll, supra, note 105, at 475. 
107 Tonry, supra note 24, at 27. 
108 See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 103, at 228 n.45; ROWAN, SUPRA NOTE 103, AT 193-94. 
109 ROWAN, SUPRA NOTE 103, AT 193-94; see also Ogletree, supra note 103, at 229 
(comparing disparate sentencing of blacks and whites for possession of same weight of 
cocaine); Tonry, supra note 24, at 52 (charting the “foreseeable disparate impact on Blacks” 
of targeting cocaine usage). 
110 See Tonry, supra note 24, at 52. 
111 See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT ch. 3 (1995); Tonry, supra note 24; ROWAN,
SUPRA NOTE 103, AT 193-94.  See also Note: Winning the War on Drugs, supra note 103, at 
1485 (The United States Public Health Service has estimated that in 1992 76% of illicit drug 
users were white, 14% were black, and 8% were Hispanic—figures that approximate the 
racial and ethnic composition of the United States.  Yet African- Americans account for 35% 
of all drug arrests, 55% of all drug convictions, and 74% of all drug sentences.”). 
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authority not endorsed by an institution.  Exercises of authority that are 
institutional from one perspective may be social from another: thus, the 
chairman of a golf club is an institutional authority from the perspective of the 
club, and social from the perspective of the legal system.   
 
Both liberal legal and social norms theories concern the institutional authority 
of the police; each provides a different account of the source and scope of 
legitimate police authority.  Where liberal legal theories’ claim that police 
authority is legitimate derives from institutional norms and is limited by the 
content of those norms — which I shall call “rule-based” authority — social 
norms theorist claim that we should recognize certain social norms as 
conferring legitimacy upon police.  Instead of rule-based justifications of 
police action, social norms theorists emphasize the functions and circumstance 
justifying police action — what I shall call “role-based” authority.   
 
A. Authority and Legitimacy
Authority and legitimacy are normative concepts.112 An authority is an entity 
that possesses a normative power over another; that is, the ability to change an 
agent’s reasons for action, either by creating protected reasons or overriding 
conflicting protected reasons.113 The authority does so by replacing an agent's 
own reasons for action with authoritative reasons.  The authority claims the 
power to govern an agent's actions and to exclude the agent’s own reasons for 
action or for action on the balance of reasons.114 
Legitimacy consists in the valid exercise of authority115 and may have a formal 
and a substantive component.  Substantive legitimacy entails that an authority 
is fully justified, by some evaluative standard, in the exercise of authority.116 
Thus, a norm is substantively legitimate when the authority correctly assesses 
the facts and values motivating the act of norm-creation as having positive 
worth.  Formal legitimacy requires that the process by which an authority 
creates, changes, or extinguishes norms is accepted as valid by those entities 
empowered to execute or enforce the norms.117 Formal legitimacy — which 
might be thought of the due-process model of legitimacy — requires only the 
partial justification of authority: it is primarily a feature of institutional 
 
112 Joseph Raz, Legitimate Authority, in JOSEPH RAZ, AUTHORITY OF LAW 3, 10 (1979) 
(“Authority is a practical concept.  This means that questions of who has authority over whom 
are practical questions; they bear on what one ought to do.” ). 
113 See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS at 101 (1990). 
114 See id..
115 Raz, supra note 112 at 12-18. 
116 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Authority, Law and Morality, in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS AND THE 
PUBLIC DOMAIN  212-14 (1994). 
117 See, e.g., HART, supra note 41, at 266-67; see also JOSEPH RAZ, AUTHORITY OF LAW 155 
& 155 n.13 (1979) 
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systems such as the law.118 As is by now familiar in legal theory, formal 
legitimacy does not entail substantive legitimacy: an authority may create 
norms in a formally legitimate manner, yet those norms may not be fully 
justified by the relevant (moral, political) evaluative standard.119 
Institutional systems share two features: first, they are systematic because the 
norms of the system are “'internally related”;120 and second, they are 
institutional, because select officials or bodies are responsible for enforcing 
the system’s norms.  H.L.A. Hart's discussion of law as a system of rules,121 
famously elaborates the systematic quality of institutional systems.  He 
distinguishes between primary and secondary rules, where primary rules are 
duty imposing, specifying what conduct is permitted or prohibited, and 
secondary rules regulate the recognition and change of, and adjudication using, 
primary rules.122 For rules to form a system the primary rules must be 
supplemented by secondary rules.123 Secondary rules identify what the rules 
of the legal system are, how they can be changed, and how any disputes 
arising from them can be settled.  That is, they specify what sort of internal 
relations the rules of a legal system can take.   
 
Joseph Raz elaborates upon Hart's description of legal systems by emphasizing 
the role of legal institutions.  Raz, who is primarily concerned to develop an 
account of institutional authority, suggests that a definitive feature of 
institutional systems is the presence of some official or body that derives its 
authority from its role in applying the norms of the system.124 Applicative 
officials are both bound to apply the norms of the system and empowered to 
do so in a manner that is, from the point of view of the organization, 
authoritative and final upon the subjects of the norms.125 That power is 
 
118 Formal legitimacy requires only that the norm-creating act of an institutional authority be 
justified according to the evaluative criteria employed by the institutional system.  These 
criteria may not be fully justified, that is, substantively legitimate.   
119 See David Lyons, Justification and Judicial Responsibility, 72 CAL. L. REV. 178 (1984) 
120 Raz, supra, note 113 at 111-3. 
121 See, e.g., HART, supra note 31, at, 2-3. 
122 Rolf Sartorius rightly notes that Hart’s discussion of primary and secondary rules in fact 
makes two kinds of distinction between primary and secondary rules, see Rolf Sartorius, 
Hart's Concept of Law, in MORE ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, 131, 131-41 (Summers, ed., 
1971); however, the duty-imposing and recognition-change-adjudication distinction is the one 
appropriate to Hart's discussion of the systemic character of law.   
123 Secondary rules “may all be said to be on a different level from the primary rules, for they 
are about such rules; in the sense that while primary rules are concerned with the actions that 
individuals must or must not do, these secondary rules are all concerned with the primary 
rules themselves.”  HART, supra note 31, at 92. 
124 Unless the norm-applying institution has the power to change the rules of the system. 
125 For more on law as an institutional system of norms, see RAZ, supra note 113, ch. 4; 
JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM chs. 6 and 7 (1990); NEIL MACCORMICK 
AND OTA WEINBERGER, AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LAW (1986); Neil MacCormick, Law 
As Institutional Fact, 90 L.Q. REV. 102 (1974); Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and the 
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formally legitimate so long as it follows institutional constraints upon official 
decision-making; it is substantively legitimate if the decision is “the right thing 
to do.”126 Police officers are, according to Raz, one such type of applicative 
body; courts are another.127 
1. Two Types of Authority 
 
Limitations on the institutional authority of various bodies or officials — 
courts, judges, police, etc. — go beyond the justification of the source of 
authority as formally or substantively legitimate.  Authority may also be 
limited by scope: the extent of the authority’s jurisdiction to act.  Constraints 
upon the scope of authority may be rule-based and role-based.  I shall call the 
scope of authority “rule-based” if it is constrained by the substantive content 
of a pre-existing norm.  I shall call the scope of authority “role-based” if it is 
constrained by the nature of the authoritative office.   
 
The scope of rule-based authority is determined by the content of a primary 
norm.128 For example, the familiar rule, “No vehicles in the park,” limits the 
scope of the official’s authority in the following way: only an object that 
counts as a vehicle may be excluded from places identifiable as a park.  The 
official may not use that rule to, e.g., enter a private dwelling.  Once the 
official acts outside or against the content of the primary rules the issue of 
legitimacy — the range of actions within the scope of the official’s 
institutional authority — arises.129 
The scope of role-based authority is determined by the authority’s status in 
relation to the subjects of authority and the circumstances in which the 
authority acts.  In an institutional system, role-based authority is governed, not 
by the content of primary norms of the system, but by secondary norms 
specifying the types of action or decision the official is entitled to undertake in 
specified circumstances.  The Judgment of Solomon provides a familiar 
example.130 In his role as king, Solomon had authority to adjudicate those 
disputes his subjects brought before him.  In this particular case, his ruling — 
 
Institutional Theory of Law, 9 RECHTSTHEORIE, Beiheft 14, 117 (1992).  But see Simpson 
arguing that no such thing as legal system 
126 In terms of justification: a substantively legitimate decision is fully justified “all things 
considered”; a formally legitimate decision is partially justified because some reasons are 
excluded from consideration. 
127 RAZ, supra note 113, at 136.   
128 See HART, supra note 31, at 94. Primary norms are those designed to control conduct.   
129 Such a view fits comfortably within most modern liberal trends in legal political theory, 
and receives its strongest modern expression in the thought of Wechsler.  See Herbert 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) 
130 Another is Adam Smith’s “ideal spectator.”  See ADAM SMITH, THEORY OF MORAL 
SENTIMENTS III.4.2 (1759) (1976); see also Eric J. Miller, “Sympathetic Exchange:” Adam 
Smith and Punishment, 9 Ratio Juris 182 (1996). 
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to bisect the subject of a custody dispute — was not authorized by the content 
of any primary norms.  The outcome — revealing the biological mother, who 
was willing to give up her child to save its life — depended upon the role-
based scope of Solomon’s authority: he had the right to settle their dispute, as 
manifested in the biological mother’s acceptance of his decision. 
 
One might consider that role-based authority entails the presence of discretion: 
it consists, after all, in the absence of primary rules of conduct.131 Rules can, 
however, contain such a grant of discretion — for example, to determine what 
is “reasonable” conduct.  Nonetheless, a reasonableness standard can, as we 
shall see, be applied in a more or less role-related manner: more, where the 
standard of reasonableness depends upon features intrinsic to the individuals 
status or role or defined by extra-institutional norms (e.g,, rules of ethics, 
administrative guidelines) fleshing out the content and purpose of the role; 
less, where there is reasonableness depends on features possessed by everyone, 
no matter what their status.  Role-based authority thus depends upon more 
than the mere indeterminacy of rules requiring further elaboration: it depends 
upon the nature of the individual or office and the circumstances in which that 
individual or office is required to operate.  In an institutional system, this 
would be to argue that something about the nature of the office and its relation 
to the system legitimates substantial discretion over a range of circumstances. 
 
For example, the “articulable suspicion” standard has become one role-based 
characterization of the police officer’s authority: so long as the officer’s 
training and experience furnishes her with some reason for stopping a suspect, 
she may do so by virtue of her role as an officer of the peace.132 In such 
circumstances, the scope of her authority need not be limited by the content of 
some primary rule that she enforces, but by her general role in preventing or 
responding to actual or threatened disturbances as determined through her 
training and departmental guidelines. 
 
Both rule- and role-based authority may be legitimated in the same way.  If 
both are institutional authorities, they obtain institutional license to act based 
upon the propriety of the formal process by which their office and, in the case 
of rule-based authority, by which the primary norm to be applied, was created.  
In institutional systems, the source of rule-based authority derives from the 
formal process of norm-enactment; the source of role-based authority derives 
from the nature of the authoritative office.  The source of their authority is 
 
131 Role-based authority thus entails the absence of both “conduct” and “decision” rules, 
where decision rules are content-based norms specifying what considerations an authority 
ought to weigh in determining how to decide a case or course of action.  See Meir Dan-
Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97
HARV. L. REV. 625, 625-31 (1984). 
132 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  
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independent of the content of their authority: that is, their pronouncements will 
still be authoritative even if wrong.133 
2. Rule- and Role-Based Conceptions of Policing 
 
One of the established ways of understanding the scope of police authority to 
interfere with private conduct is Herbert Packer’s famous contrast of two 
conflicting models of police practice: the crime-control and due-process 
models of criminal procedure.134 Both legal liberal  and social norms theories 
may be understood, as I have suggested elsewhere,135 as a modern embodiment 
of the due-process and crime-control models.136 
What I call legal liberal and Packer calls “due process” critiques of the 
criminal justice system emphasize role-based principles of proportionality and 
individual dignity.  The individual’s rights are respected and expressed 
through prospective, adversarial, court-regulated constraints upon the 
executive discretion to investigate, detain, and search suspects.137 Criminal 
defendants are afforded significant rights and protections, including rights 
against self-incrimination and the right to counsel. The presumption of 
innocence and the burden of proof establish core limits on governmental 
power.138 
Social norms theories comport more closely with the crime-control model, 
organized around the principle of repression of antisocial conduct.  Crime 
control affords the executive branch wide discretion in pursuing and 
 
133 H.L.A. Hart suggests that reasons for action are content-independent if they are “intended 
to function as a reason independently of the nature or character of the actions to be done.” 
Hart, supra note 41, at 254. Differently put, content-independent justifications are 
intransitive.  Transitive justifications are those in which A justifies B, and B justifies C, and A 
justifies C.  Intransitive justifications are those in which A justifies B, and B justifies C, but A 
does not justify C.  For various discussions of intransitivity, see JOSEPH RAZ, MORALITY OF
FREEDOM, 325-326 (1988); ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS at 
67-8 (1995). And see Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth Anderson, Slinging Arrows at 
Democracy; Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV 2121, 2148-51 (1990). 
134 See Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1-23  
(1964). 
135 See Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial 
Interventionism, 65 OHIO STATE L.J. 1479, 1504-1512 (2004). 
136 See Packer, supra note 134, at 1-23. 
137 See id.
138 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Rehnquist Revolution in Criminal Procedure, in THE 
REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT (H. Schwartz, ed., 2002); Charles J. 
Ogletree, Jr. & Yoav Sapir, Keeping Gideon’s Promise through Public Defender Offices: The 
American and the Israeli Experiences (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). See 
also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 
(1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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prosecuting criminals; accordingly, it places great trust in the police’s capacity 
to determine which suspects are guilty or innocent.139 Norms scholars reject 
court-enforced legalism and rule-of-law constraints upon law enforcement in 
favor of highly discretionary forms of policing designed to reflect a sensitivity 
to social norms.140 This style of policing is facilitated by a legislative agenda 
creating series of highly interventionist regime for enforcing public order, 
designed in part to enable the police to isolate degenerate social influences 
from the rest of the community.141 
a. Rule-based Policing 
 
One source for the liberal legal concern with executive enforcement of the 
criminal law was the growing perception, through the 1950s and 1960s, of the 
then-current practice of law enforcement as akin to “set-thief-to-catch-a-
thief.”142 Until Mapp v. Ohio,143 police investigation had been dominated by a 
“crime control model” that afforded the executive branch almost unlimited 
discretion in pursuing and prosecuting criminals.144 The crime-control model 
limited or delayed the use of formal procedural checks on the government’s 
use of that discretion;145 minimized substantive distinctions between 
defendants on the basis of race or economic or social status; “and exhibit[ed] a 
large degree of confidence in the government’s identification of suspects as 
guilty of the crime with which they [we]re charged.”146 Investigative 
procedures tended to concentrate upon the person of the accused as “the most 
likely and accurate source of that information.”147 Confessions were the prime 
source of evidence and the evidentiary barriers to obtaining such confessions 
 
139 See Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial 
Interventionism, 65 OHIO STATE L.J. 1479, 1505 (2004). 
140 See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 74, at 640-45; Meares & Kahan, Norms, supra note 8; 
Kahan & Meares, Crisis, supra note 1. 
141 On social norms and interventionism, see, for example, Meares, Connections, supra note 
10, at 593 (promoting curfews, gang-loitering laws, and order-maintenance strategies). See 
also Meares, Place And Crime, supra note 5, at 695 (same); Meares & Kahan, Norms, supra 
note 8; Kahan & Meares, Crisis, supra note 1, at 1160-66.   Isolation from degenerate social 
influences is a major feature of the social norms movement.  See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 
74, at 640-45 (discussing curfews and civil injunctions to exclude gangs from law-abiding 
neighborhoods); Meares, Connections, supra note 10, at 593. 
142 See, e.g. Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1735. 
143 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
144 See Packer, supra note 134, at 1-23. 
145 Packer calls such checks “ceremonious rituals.”  Id. at 159. 
146 Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger 
Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 224 (1983) (“crime control ideology 
suggests that criminal procedure should function exclusively to punish the guilty.  It values 
fair process norms primarily for their instrumental tendency to promote good ‘results’”). 
147 Raneta Lawson Mack, It's Broke So Let's Fix It: Using a Quasi-Inquisitorial Approach to 
Limit the Impact of Bias in the American Criminal Justice System, 7 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV., 63, 70 (1996). 
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were few if any.148 In particular, the police use of the “third degree” — 
beating prisoners — to obtain confessions posed a significant worry.149 
The administrative discretion afforded the police went hand-in-hand with the 
racial and social segregation of local forces.  Often, the police served as 
instruments of state repression, enforcing express and implicit norms of 
segregation.150 
It is almost commonplace by now that much of the Court's criminal 
procedure jurisprudence during the middle part of this century was a 
form of race jurisprudence, prompted largely by the treatment of 
black suspects and black defendants in the South.  The Court's 
concern with race relations served as the unspoken subtext of many of 
its significant criminal procedure decisions.151 
Prior to Mapp, then, most policing could be characterized as lacking much 
state and any federal regulation.152 The police were the recipients of a massive 
grant of discretion through the absence of any express rules specifying 
appropriate conduct or establishing appropriate values.  Where there was some 
form of regulatory scheme placing limits on conduct such schemes were 
transformed, through the lack of effective sanction, into a license.153 What 
 
148 Id.
149 “From their inception, modern police forces have been plagued by the twin problems of 
corruption and brutality… The sort of ‘excesses’ to which the police have regularly resorted 
both on the street and in the stationhouse — beatings, torture, false arrests, the third-degree, 
and the like — are well-documented.” Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First 
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 834, 836 (1994) (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 152-53 (1993); DAVID R. PAPKE, FRAMING 
THE CRIMINAL: CRIME, CULTURAL WORK, AND THE LOSS OF CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE, 1830- 
1900, 122 (1987); SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 63 (1980); ERNEST J. HOPKINS, OUR LAWLESS POLICE: A STUDY OF THE 
UNLAWFUL ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW (1931)).  See also Livingston, supra note 74, at 565-
66 (discussing police corruption as a significant problem for the police as traditionally 
constituted). 
150 See Livingston, supra note 74, at 593 (“police practices that were imbued with persistent 
hostility to the poor, to dissidents, and especially to racial minorities.”). 
151 David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth 
Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 316 (1997) (citing Robert M. Cover, The Origins of 
Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1305-06 (1982); Steiker, 
supra note 149, at 841-44); A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67
MICH. L. REV. 249, 256 (1968)). 
152 Before incorporation of the Fourth Amendment, the federal Constitution would of course 
apply only to the federal government, and so the primary target of fourth-amendment 
regulation was the F.B.I. 
153 See Yale Kamisar, In Defense of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL'Y 119, 124 (2003) (hereinafter Kamisar, Defense); Yale Kamisar, Remembering 
the “Old World” of Criminal Procedure: A Reply to Professor Grano, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
537, 559 (1990) (hereinafter Kamisar, “Old World” Criminal Procedure). Kamisar notes that 
People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585 (NY App. Ct. 1926), which established the New York State 
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changed was the discovery or re-conceptualization of the police as possessing 
a “distinctive mentality” and forming a “discrete and unified group”154 with its 
own set of race- and class-biases. This understanding of the police as an 
administrative agency that had supplanted the values of democratic 
government, expressed through the Equal Protection Clause, with its own 
discriminatory and anti-democratic animus, formed the bedrock of the Warren 
Court’s “revolution in criminal procedure.”155 
The problem with law enforcement, on this picture, is the familiar one of 
unelected officials — in this case the police — displacing or replacing 
legislative will by interpreting and enforcing the law according to their own 
personal values or preferences.156 The institutional and individual autonomy 
of the police, combined with a shared and pervasive discriminatory and anti-
democratic attitude, generated a widespread distrust in liberal commentators 
and the Court.157 The legal liberal solution should be understood as an 
executive correlate to the “neutral principles” doctrine developed to constrain 
judicial discretion.158 Liberals sought to replace the degenerate values of the 
self-regulated criminal justice system with “a fair and dignified legal 
process,”159 one that “treats all criminal suspects with dignity and respect.”160 
Where the police institutionally or individually interjected their own 
 
law on the admissibility of illegally seized evidence applicable prior to Mapp, was ignored by 
executive officials unaffected by the exclusion of tainted evidence. 
154 Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1735. 
155 See, e.g.,Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century 
Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 4 (1995) (dating the revolution as lasting from 1961-1967 at 
the latest); see also COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 5.  
156 See Weschler, supra note 129. 
157 Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1735-6. 
158 See Weschler, supra note 129. According to Wechsler, neutral principles are 
“criteria that can be framed and tested as an exercise of reason and not merely as an act of 
willfulness or will.”  Id. at 11.  The avoidance of willfulness is ensured by a reliance upon 
pre-existing, legislated (and in the context of constitutional interpretation, constitutional)
values.  See id. at 16; see also Jon O. Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral 
Principles: The Legitimacy of Institutional Values, 72 CAL. L. REV. 200 (1984); Felix 
Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1934,
49 HARV. L. REV. 68, 90-91, 94-96 (1935); Brian Bix, Book Review: Positively Positivism 
(Review of Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence by Anthony J. Sebok), 85 VA. L
REV. 889, 898-99 (1999). 
159 H. Richard Ulliver, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of 
the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1138 (1987).  Arenella asserts 
that “A public trial, if fairly conducted, sends its own message about dignity, fairness, and 
justice that contributes to the moral force of the criminal sanction.”  Arenella, supra note at 
146, at 203, 219.  
160 Arenella, supra note at 146, at 190.  See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 
(1966) (“the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege [against self-incrimination] is 
the respect a government  state or federal  must accord to the dignity and integrity of its 
citizens.”).  
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conceptions of proper social relations into the process of policing,161 the 
remedy was to remove this source of bias and require the police to adhere to a 
rule-based system of values antecedently established by the legislature (or 
founders of the Constitution), as monitored by the courts.   
 
Henceforth, the power of the police was to be constrained by the content of the 
primary rules of criminal procedure stated in and developed out of the Fourth, 
Fifth, and Sixth Amendment as well as other rules of appropriate conduct 
promulgated by legislatures and courts.  Accordingly, legal liberals 
emphasized formal judicial oversight beginning at the pre-trial process162 so as 
to control, in part, illegitimate class- and race-based police discretion and 
remedy substantive class- and race-based differences between defendants.163 
This process bears all the hallmarks of rule-based constraints upon police 
authority: the rejection of individual autonomy in favor of authority extending 
only so far as the content of the primary norms would permit.  The fact that 
these primary norms were addressed to the police is precisely to the point. 
Many of the major liberal reform proposals exemplify the rule-based approach 
to constraints on police authority.  For example, Anthony Amsterdam, in his 
discussion of the proper basis for the justification of Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule,164 suggested that the propriety of executive law enforcement 
practice should be measured by conformity to express standards of conduct 
enacted by legislatures (either state or municipal) or by the police themselves 
(as a set of administrative rules).165 These norms would set the content of 
executive procedure — how police and prosecutors are to interact with the 
public — and so limit the scope of police authority.  Such rules have the 
advantage of increased transparency, such that the community is aware of the 
norms of conduct governing their interactions with the executive.166 “Police 
rulemaking would bring [such norms] to visibility not merely for the police 
command but also for the community.  Departmental rules would be subject to 
a kind of scrutiny by the community and by local police organs.”167 
161 Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1734-6. 
162 See  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (“searches conducted outside the judicial 
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment – subject only to a few specifically established and well-deliniated 
exceptions.”). 
163 See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972) (“The rule of law, 
evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, to the poor as well as to the rich, is the 
great mucilage that holds society together.”). 
164 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives On the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349 (1973-74). 
165 Id. at 416-25. 
166 See Carl McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659, 667, 681 (1972) 
(stating that “visibility of rulemaking process is its greatest virtue”). 
167 Amsterdam, supra note 164, at 422. “The individual police officer . . . would be inclined 
to view his responsibilities more gravely and in broader perspective and to evaluate more 
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Amsterdam stresses that legislation is “a deliberative process [of] community 
consultation and . . . community scrutiny.”168 An open consultative process 
preceding legislation followed by public promulgation of the posited rules 
broadcasts “the fact, the agent and the content of decision-making [and] tends 
to ensure that the decisions which are made will conform to the community’s 
standards of justice.”169 Such a process, though not required by the Fourth 
Amendment, exhibits the rule-based virtues of legislative supremacy and 
deference to government.170 Absent a participative legislative process and 
clear rules, legal liberals claim, differential policing and prosecution practice is 
— while not determinative of executive animus — indicative of executive 
disregard for the targets of policing.171 
b. Role-Based Policing 
 
Relatively quickly, however, policing and with it the attitudes to policing, 
experienced an overhaul.  Changes in selection and training, resulting in a 
force that is both more diverse and more professional, transformed the Court’s 
perception of the police.172 Rather than a source of disorder, the police have 
become the solution to problems of public order and high crime.173 Under the 
current regime, so long as police enforcement activities are “reasonable” given 
the officer’s understanding at the time she acts, her activity will generally 
survive fourth-amendment scrutiny.174 This change in emphasis from rules to 
reasonableness, I shall argue, transforms the basis for the scope of police 
 
thoughtfully the impact and propriety of various courses of action open to him.  He would be 
both more accessible and more receptive to community input . . . and he would stand to be 
judged and questioned by the department and the community upon irrefutable evidence of the 
content of the decision he had made.”  Id. at 424.   
168 Id. at  425. 
169 Id. at 427. 
170 See Laurence H. Tribe, Erog .v Hsub And Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore From Its 
Hall Of Mirrors, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 170, 231, 231 n.243 (2001) (discussing virtues of 
accountability and transparency); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW § 17-3 at 1684 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that mode of interaction sets appropriate limits on 
executive direction of social organization). 
171 See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST 513 (1965); Kenneth Culp Davis, Police Discretion 
137-38 (1975); Amsterdam supra note 164, at 423. 
172 See Sklansky, supra note 151, at 303 (“Fourth Amendment cases may have become easier 
for the Court because the justices now share a set of underlying understandings that are 
markedly more favorable to law enforcement than to criminal suspects”).  On this “shared 
understanding,” see id. at 299-308. 
173 Livingston, supra note 74, at 565-66. 
174 See, e.g. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. 
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authority from rule-based to a role-based: it is by virtue of the official’s status 
as police officer that she has the power to act in the specified circumstances.175 
One major feature of the shift in attitudes to the police is the advent of an 
administrative approach emphasizing the liberal-bureaucratic values of 
rationality and efficiency in law enforcement.176 The police now, for the most 
part, share the same values as the citizens they protect and are not 
characterized, by the Courts at least, as a race-biased and anti-democratic 
institution.  The exercise of police power is not an act of race-based thuggery 
but is rather directed by training and professional know-how.  The police are 
skilled experts in investigating and controlling law-breaking conduct: they are 
required to make context-dependent and pressured decisions in rapidly 
evolving and potentially dangerous situations to ensure public safety, restore 
order, and apprehend criminals.177 The problem is no longer replacing a set of 
informal and illegitimate values with ones that are express, prospective, 
formal, and legitimate.178 The interposition of autonomous police values in the 
process of law enforcement poses no challenge to democracy because police 
and people (or at least courts) share the same set of understandings. 
 
Nowhere is this transformation — from the rule-based and autonomy-
constricting response to police bias to a role-based and autonomy-promoting 
approach — more striking than the development of Terry v. Ohio’s 
“reasonable suspicion” standard.179 Terry, which purportedly marks the end of 
the Warren Court’s “revolution in criminal procedure,”180 was among the first 
cases after Mapp to question the warrant requirement and to spark a battle over 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Its legacy was to transform a unitary 
understanding of seizure — the arrest — and the singular probable-cause 
evidentiary requirement into one that is multiple and particularized.  Each 
seizure can now be distinguished by different amounts of police coercion and 
justified by discrete evidentiary requirements, may be of greater or lesser 
 
175 Two of the few other articles considering in depth a role-based account of the police are 
David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1228-29 (1999); Elizabeth 
E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49 (2004). 
176 See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 74, at 565-66; Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1735-6. 
177 See Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and 
Disorder In New York, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457 (2000) (race-based police stops justified 
in “case law as the sound exercise of ‘professional judgment’ by police officers.”) 
178 According to David Sklansky, the courts have a set of pro-police “shared understandings” 
around the values underlying policing, understandings that are no less powerful for being 
premised upon a legal fiction. See Sklansky, supra note 151, at 303, 320-23. 
179 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. 
180 See Kamisar, supra note 155, at 4. 
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duration, and may permit various types of collateral searches or removal the 
suspect’s person from the scene.181 
David Sklansy argues that we should regard Terry, not a grant of discretion, 
but as limitation upon it.182 Terry in fact constrains the police power to stop 
and frisk by requiring some “articulable suspicion” sufficient to withstand 
(admittedly subsequent) court scrutiny rather than simply the individual 
officer’s hunches or vague suspicions.183 This moderately rule-based approach 
to Terry did not survive.  Now, almost any non-prohibited justification that can 
be articulated will suffice to provide reasonable suspicion,184 and does so 
because such reasons operate precisely to characterize the police as well-
trained, experienced experts responding to “imponderable evidence” of 
criminality.185 The articulation of reasons displays the officer’s role-based 
qualifications and legitimates the officer’s role-based expertise.   
 
As Carol Steiker notes, by exporting Terry’s reasonableness requirement into 
various ad-hoc exceptions to the warrant requirement the Burger and 
Rehnquist courts managed, in a bloodless coup, to overturn the rule-based due-
process approach of the Warren Court.186 The Court’s change in approach was 
 
181 See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, “Seizures” Typology: Classifying Detentions of the Person to 
Resolve Warrant, Grounds, and Search Issues, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 417, 417-18 (1984) 
(formerly one-dimensional approach to seizure now multi-dimensional). 
182 See Sklansky, supra note 151, at 315-16. 
183 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 27; Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1735-6. 
184 See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (plurality opinion); Florida v. Rodriguez, 
469 U.S. 1 (1984); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002). 
185 See, e.g., LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (2001).  The 
Austrian-English philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein suggested that it is just such 
imponderable evidence that forms the basis upon which “experts” exercise their judgment.  
See id.; Ray Monk, How to Read Wittgenstein 99-106 (2005).  The notion of imponderable 
evidence has its correlate in the emphasis on “experience” or “training.”  See Arvizu, 534 
U.S. at 273 (“reviewing courts should … look at the “totality of the circumstances” of each 
case … This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training 
to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them 
that “might well elude an untrained person.”); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 
(1996) (suggesting that “a police officer views the facts through the lens of his police 
experience and expertise” and discussing range of otherwise innocuous facts that will justify 
the suspicion of a well-trained officer); Rodriguez, 469 U.S. at 6 (discussing contribution of 
training to establishing articulable suspicion); Royer, 460 U.S. at 525 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (“Any one of these factors relied upon by the Miami police may have been as 
consistent with innocence as with guilt;  but the combination of several of these factors is the 
essence of both ‘articulable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause.’”); United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. 544, 563-64 (1980) (‘it is important to recall that a trained law enforcement agent 
may be ‘able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly 
innocent to the untrained observer.’”). 
186 See, e.g., Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 582-83 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting there are 
at least twenty-two exceptions to the warrant requirement and that “[o]ur intricate body of law 
regarding ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ has been developed largely as a means of 
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predominantly a matter of “style”187 and procedure,188 a move from 
“prophylactic”189 rule-based constraints to a more fluid role-based series of 
considerations.  The Court accomplished the reasonableness counter-
revolution without overruling Warren Court precedents. 190 Where the Warren 
Court expressed a special distrust of the police, the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts have generally expressed empathy.191 
The result of this procedural “counter revolution” is a Fourth Amendment 
often characterized as “inconsistent and incoherent,”192 “an embarrassment,”193 
and “filled with apparent contradictions.”194 I believe, however, that the 
current state of Fourth Amendment law might profitably be reconsidered as 
expressing a conflict over rule-based versus role-based constraints.  On my 
reading, Terry has been transformed from a rule-based limitation upon police 
power controlled through the requirement of express justification into a role-
based grant of authority. 
 
For example, Phyllis Bookspan argues that “the reasonableness approach 
focuses on the acts of the police instead of the rights of the people.”195 Where 
a rights focus invites a rule-based approach, the Court’s reasonableness 
 
creating these exceptions, enabling a search to be denominated not a Fourth Amendment 
‘search’ and therefore not subject to the general warrant requirement.”). 
187 Carol S. Steiker, Counter- Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two 
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2492-93 (1996). 
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Nowhere is this more apparent than in the area of consent searches: while, in Schneckloth 
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), both Justices Douglas and Marshall adopted a suspect 
focused and rule-based model of authority in adopting the Ninth Circuit’s worry that “a 
reasonable person might read an officer's ‘May I’ as the courteous expression of a demand 
backed by force of law,” id. at 276 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 289 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (citing  448 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1973), the majority’s officer-focused and role-
based model of authority exhibits no such concern.  In fact, a focus on the investigative role 
of the police — dependant as it is upon an ethics of autonomy — has created a mirror image 
of the reasonable officer in the reasonable and robust citizen, sufficiently self-reliant to resist 
police imprecations.  See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984).  This is, as Sklanky notes, a 
legal fiction, Sklansky, supra note 151, at 320-23; it operates as an “understanding,” id. at 
303, or, as Steiker would say, at the level of a decision rule (whether the decision is to trust 
the police and require a certain fortitude on the part of the public in police-public 
interactions); and is at the root of much investigation “outside” the Fourth Amendment’s 
purview. 
192 Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth 
Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 474 (1991). 
193 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757 
(1994) 
194 William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 881-
910 (1991). 
195 Bookspan, supra note 192, at 477. 
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analysis has generally “eschewed bright-line rules … [o]r ‘litmus-paper 
test[s]’ or single ‘sentence or ... paragraph ... rule[s]’ … or per se rule[s].”196 
The touchstones of the reasonableness analysis are role-based considerations 
of context,197 status, and purpose:198 the “endless variations in the facts and 
circumstances” translated through “experience” or “training,” into the police 
decision to search or seize.199 
Role-based understandings of the scope of authority are concerned to identify 
the range of activities suited to the official’s institutional or social status — in 
the case of the police, criminal investigation.  Role-based justifications thus 
extend beyond the regime of institutional rules (if there is any) creating the 
office to encompass non-institutional, administrative or customary 
understandings of the role.200 This change in attitude is profoundly important 
for the manner in which courts will agree to scrutinize conduct and hold the 
police accountable.  A court (or other decision-maker) asks how that sort of 
agent would act in circumstances that trigger her role.  Put simply, role-based 
authority concerns the circumstances and purposes that empower an official to 
act (the secondary rules of a legal system) rather than (primary) norms, the 
content of which define the scope of legitimate authority.201 
196 Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996) (citing Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 
567 (1988); Royer, 460 U.S. 491; Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); Schneckloth, 412 
U.S. 218). 
197 See Royer, 460 U.S. at 506; see also Robinette, 519 U.S. at 40; Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213 (1983). 
198 See, e.g., Royer, 460 U.S. at 520 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The opinion nonetheless, in 
my view, betrays a mind-set more useful to those who officiate at shuffleboard games, 
primarily concerned with which particular square the disc has landed on, than to those who 
are seeking to administer a system of justice whose twin purposes are the conviction of the 
guilty and the vindication of the innocent.”). 
199 Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273; Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699; Rodriguez, 469 U.S. at 6; Royer, 460 
U.S. at 525 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 563-64. 
200 Non-institutional, of course, from the legal perspective.  The Court rejected holding law 
enforcement to account through their administrative and role-defining procedures in United 
States v. Robinson, 94 S. Ct. 467, 470, 470-71 n.2 (1973).  On Robinson and police 
procedure, see Amsterdam, supra note 164, at 414-5. 
201 Carol Steiker relies upon Meir Dan-Cohen’s distinction between decision and conduct 
norms to explain the manner in which the Burger and Rehnquist Courts eviscerated many of 
the protections of the Warren Court.  See Steiker, supra note , 2470-71, 2533-3540 (1996); 
see also Meir Dan-Cohen, supra note 131, at 626.  I believe that Dan-Cohen’s distinction 
between decision and conduct norms is somewhat confusing: at some points he appears to rest 
the distinction upon the norm’s addressees; at other points it appears to be a distinction 
between mandatory norms and power-conferring norms.  Id. at 626-635.  Furthermore, he 
suggests that there can be “acoustic separation” between decision and conduct norms, such 
that the Court’s power to apportion responsibility can be totally separated, as a conceptual 
matter, from the legislature’s power to pre- or proscribe conduct.  Id. at 626.  For a variety of 
reasons, I reject the notion of acoustic separation between decision and conduct norms as 
either possible or desirable, I believe decision norms send a message about  — or in social 
norms terms, send a signal about the social meaning of — acceptable conduct. 
ROLE-BASED POLICING 
33
 
Role-based authority is thus focused on the (institutional) agent in the context 
of action — performing the job with which they have been entrusted, given the 
circumstances and appropriate level competence.  It concerns issues of 
professional identity and ethics rather than a morality of rights and duties.  The 
Court evaluates the decision to act based upon “whether the[ ] historical facts, 
viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount 
to reasonable suspicion or to probable cause.”202 Under the reasonableness 
standard, the Court focuses on contextual triggers, changing circumstances, 
and pragmatic responses to the problems presented by the investigative 
process.  The Court has removed a variety of impediments to the officer’s 
performance of her job, sometimes on the basis of inconvenience or danger,203 
sometimes as essential to the very possibility of following up on investigative 
hunches,204 sometimes because to do otherwise would lead investigating 
officers to disregard the law.205 
B. Social Norms and Role-Based Policing
Social norms theorists embrace role-based police autonomy and agency, and 
propose to empower policing through a legislative program using low-level, 
substantive criminal laws to undermine those antisocial activities constitutive 
of disorder.206 If the police are to be constrained, it is through their self-
regulated sensitivity to neighborhood mores that help them to determine what 
type and levels of order different communities prize.207 Accordingly, social 
norms scholars are, to a considerable extent, concerned with the impact of 
policing on neighborhoods and communities evaluated through local, social 
norms.  
 
As a substitute for the punishment-oriented War on Drugs, social norms 
theorists suggest a variety of policing practices designed to promote order and 
 
202 Ornelas, 517 U.S. 690. 
203 See Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106, 110-11 (1971) (danger of deliberate or 
accidental hazard on stopping automobile justifies bright-line rule permitting officer to order 
suspect from vehicle); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (“workable rule” 
permitting search of passenger compartment of automobile). 
204 I take this to be one of the underlying rationales for consent searches.  See Robinette, 519 
U.S. at 39-40 (citing Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567; Royer, 460 U.S. 491; Bostick, 501 U.S. 429; 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218). 
205 See Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (“If the affidavits submitted by police officers are subjected to 
the type of scrutiny some courts have deemed appropriate, police might well resort to 
warrantless searches, with the hope of relying on consent or some other exception to the 
warrant clause that might develop at the time of the search.”) 
206 See Meares, Social Organization, supra note 10, at 223-24. 
207 Livingston, Communities, supra note 10. 
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enable adult supervision of local youths.208 Reverse stings, youth curfews, 
anti-loitering ordinances,209 and laws addressing automobile cruising and 
aggressive panhandling,210 civil injunctions and civil sanctions,211 are enforced 
across diverse communities, in part to spot and punish outsiders, often from 
more socially affluent communities.212 Adult authority is enforced by the 
variety of measures designed to remove youths from the streets and prevent 
them accumulating in intimidating numbers or public spaces; particular 
individuals  — gang members and other crime-seeking outsiders — may be 
identified and prevented from entering the community.213 This municipal-
government emphasis on local, neighborhood organic solidarity214 expressed 
through policing demonstrates the virtues of neutrality, absence of bias, and 
respect for law-abiders necessary to encourage local perceptions of police 
legitimacy.215 
For social norms theorists, the emphasis is not on criminal procedure and 
norms of police conduct, but on substantive criminal laws directed at the 
public.  From this role-based perspective, primary rules — curfews, loitering 
ordinances, and the like — operate not to constrain police power but to expand 
it.  Social norms scholars want to create new, low-level crimes (or targets of 
policing) and in so doing facilitate a new, preventative role for the police that 
requires not only freedom from geographically or jurisdictionally broad 
constraints upon localized interpretations of the manner in which the norms 
are to be enforced (through local guidelines and local community-police 
partnerships) but also a positive creation of a range of new (low-level) powers 
to police otherwise innocent conduct, justified by participative community 
self-regulation.  The real debate is not about discretion but the creation of a 
slew of low-level crimes that extend the grounds for stopping and searching 
pedestrians for reasons only collaterally related to the envisaged social 
 
208 Meares, Policing, supra note 15, at 1606; Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at, 699 
(1998); Meares, Social Organization, supra note 10, at 223-24; Meares, Connections, supra 
note 10, at 591-92; Kahan & Meares, Crisis, supra note 1. 
209 Meares & Kahan, Norms, supra note 8, at 827; see also Meares, Social Organization, 
supra note 10, at 220-26 (discussing reverse stings and anti-gang ordinances); Meares, 
Policing, supra note 15, at 1612 (same). 
210 Livingston, Communities, supra note 10, at 636. 
211 Id. at 638-45. 
212 Meares & Kahan, Norms, supra note 8, at 818-819 (“reverse-sting arrestees are likely to be 
more racially and economically diverse than the drug offenders arrested under a buy-bust 
procedure”). 
213 See, e.g., ARCHON FUNG, EMPOWERED PARTICIPATION: REINVENTING URBAN 
DEMOCRACY 1-18 (2004); Fung, Beyond & Below, supra note 80, at 618-23. 
214 See Livingston, Communities, supra note 10. 
215 See Tracey L. Meares, Neal Katyal, & Dan M. Kahan, Updating the Study of Punishment,
56 STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1195 (2004); Meares, supra note 55, at 412-13; Meares, Legitimacy 
& Law, supra note 28, at 403-04. 
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harm.216 That concerns, not rule-based limits upon the scope of police 
authority to search and seize citizens, but the criminalization of everyday life: 
not criminal procedure, but substantive criminal law. 
 
Refocusing the debate on autonomy rather than discretion explains a puzzling 
feature of the social norms posture — the oddity of demanding discretion 
when the police already have it in spades.217 As David Cole notes: 
 
In fact, the courts are quite hospitable to police discretion, as a result 
of a host of decisions by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts that have 
substantially undermined the constitutional protections of the Warren 
Court era. Thus, although the [social norms] scholars … sometimes 
talk as if they are calling for radical change, in fact their arguments 
are more aptly described as an apology for a sea-change that has 
already taken place in constitutional criminal procedure.218 
These rules vest individual officers or departments with considerable 
discretion to determine to select as a target of investigation.219 They permit the 
police to engage in a variety of encounters, including “mere…questioning”220 
or examining the individual's identification,221 and others deemed 
“consensual,” including requesting to search luggage,222 without requiring the 
police to warn suspects of their right to refuse consent, all of which avoid 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny.223 
216 William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2153-54, 2154 
n.53 (2002) (“The key exception to the warrant requirement is the one for searches incident to 
arrest.  [Citation omitted].  That doctrine allows the police to search the person and 
belongings of anyone who the police have probable cause to believe has committed a crime. 
Since crimes can include such things as traffic offenses, [citation omitted], this power gives 
the police the ability to search, without a warrant, almost anyone in a vehicle, plus (depending 
on the stringency of local curfews and quality-of-life ordinances) a large portion of the 
pedestrian population to boot.”). 
217 Cole, Discretion, supra note 8, at 1060. 
218 Id. at 1062. 
219 “These rules allow the police to approach and investigate people for any reason or none at 
all; the officer's discretion is wholly unregulated. In other settings, the officer's discretion is 
subject only to the most deferential oversight, as in ‘stop and frisk’ encounters, which may be 
predicated on ‘reasonable suspicion,’ a standard that itself defers substantially to the officer's 
on-the-scene judgment and experience.”  Id. at 1072. 
220 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434.  See also Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216; Rodriguez, 469 U.S. at 5-6. 
221 See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216 (1984); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544. 
222 Royer, 460 U.S. at 501. 
223 See id. at 497 (“law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely 
approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is 
willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing to 
listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such 
questions.”). 
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That oddity stems, I would suggest, from a confusion between discretion 
(which I have suggested consists in the absence of rule-based constraint) and 
role-based authority (which consists in a power to act).  The Fourth 
Amendment debate revolves around the presence or absence of constraints 
upon intrusions upon individual privacy.  What social norms scholars seek, 
however, is something more than the absence of constraint; they are, in fact, 
happy with certain forms of local limits on executive discretion and generally 
seek to minimize the intrusive styles of policing that lead to arrest and 
incarceration.  Rather, they propose a separation of investigative and 
preventative roles to empower the police to take on preventative policing. 
 
IV. IDENTIFYING THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS
Many inner-city communities suffer from what might be called a crisis of 
legitimacy; norms that support law-abiding behavior are rejected or ignored in 
favor of norms supporting law breaking.  Government institutions are regarded 
with suspicion or disdain and community members regard state-sponsored 
efforts to enforce the criminal law as motivated by malign racial and class 
stereotypes.  Crime rates are high.224 
Other inner-city communities, though equally poor or with similarly large 
minority populations do not experience this type of crisis.  Although sharing a 
variety of social and economic problems in common with other impoverished, 
urban, predominantly minority communities, these neighborhoods do not have 
runaway crime rates and are much more self-regulating than the law-breaking 
ones.225 They accept the government’s right to posit new norms and tend to 
endorse the norms independent of their content.226 
I claim that the legitimacy crisis in the criminal law depends upon justified 
public perceptions of a disjunction between the formal and substantive 
legitimacy of certain laws and policing practices.  In this section, I begin by 
distinguishing legal liberal accounts emphasizing rule-based formal legitimacy 
from social norms accounts that highlight role-based substantive legitimacy.227 
My claim is that rule-based legitimacy cannot provide an adequate response to 
recent discussions of the race- and class-neutral animus behind formally 
 
224 Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5. 
225 Id. at, 676 (suggesting that “both structural organization and cultural organization in 
neighborhoods help to explain the crime that occurs in them.”). 
226 Reasons are content-independent if they are “intended to function as a reason 
independently of the nature or character of the actions to be done.”  Hart, supra note 41, at 
254; see also RAZ, supra note 133 at 35.
227 Simon, supra note 7, at 7-10; 48-74 (contrasting liberal legal emphasis on “analytical, 
individualistic, categorical, judicially enforceable, and corrective…[r]ights…derived 
analytically by the application of legal reasoning to authoritative sources” with legal 
pragmatism of social norms theorists). 
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legitimate norms endorsed by social norms theorists.  Neither, however, can 
participative local empowered democracy justify substantively illegitimate 
laws.  Accordingly, the limits of democratic governance engender problems of 
accountability and control at both legislative and executive levels that neither 
theory can properly accommodate.  
 
A. Differential Enforcement, Policing, and Legitimacy
It is common ground between social norms and legal liberal theorists that 
unjustified differential enforcement of the law across communities adversely 
impacts both the fact and perceptions of governmental legitimacy.228 
Sometimes it appears that there is no such thing as “criminal law,” and that the 
law as applied depends upon the whim of law enforcement officials — police 
and prosecutors — empowered to interpret, apply, and refuse to apply properly 
legislated norms.229 At other times it appears that the police target some 
communities for heightened attention for malicious or discriminatory 
reasons.230 
Within such “target” communities, moreover, the police may use public, 
invasive investigation and enforcement mechanisms, such as youth curfews 
and stop-and-frisk searches.231 This style of policing frequently fails to 
distinguish adequately between criminal and non-criminal, such that law-
breakers and law-abiders alike are stigmatized as criminal by the law.232 This 
disparate impact on different communities, and on law-abiding individuals in 
those communities, undermines public respect for the law. 
 
As a result, a number of legal liberal scholars have denounced the “over-
policing” of inner-city communities as antithetical to their wellbeing.233 A
central link between traditional and modern liberal legal critiques is to 
characterize current policing as relatively unconstrained by prospective 
legislation234 and to explain differential enforcement across communities as 
consciously or unconsciously racially motivated and so formally 
illegitimate.235 Many liberal legal scholars have gone further to equate the 
differential legislative impact of the War on Drugs on poor and rich, minority 
 
228 Stuntz, Race, Class & Drugs, supra note 2; Meares & Kahan, Norms, supra note 8. 
229 See, e.g., Husak, supra note 61. 
230 Stuntz, Race, Class & Drugs, supra note 2. 
231 See, e.g. David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the 
Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271 (1997). 
232 Stuntz, Race, Class & Drugs, supra note 2.  Executive activity may be structured directly, 
by norms telling the enforcement agents what to do, or indirectly, by social or legislative 
norms that suggest the community’s priorities for law enforcement. 
233 See, e.g., Cole, Paradox of Race and Crime, supra note 5. 
234 See Cole, Discretion, supra note 8, at 1062. 
235 TONRY, supra note 1, at 4-5, 123; Butler, Jury Nullification, supra note 6. 
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and majority, with some form of class- or race-based animus.236 Proponents of 
a race-based analysis claim that even if the government is not consciously 
motivated by race in developing legislative or executive norms,237 it is careless 
of the foreseeable consequences of its legislation and in particular it impact on 
the African American community.238 The argument is then that such 
legislation, given its disparate effect on people of color, is an illegitimate 
expression of “unconscious racism”239 and “malign neglect.”240 To 
demonstrate animus, this: 
 
antisubordination approach to equality would not require Black 
defendants to prove that the prosecutions are motivated by racial bias. 
Rather than requiring victims to prove distinct instances of 
discriminating behavior in the administrative process, the anti-
subordination approach considers the concrete effects of government 
policy on the substantive condition of the disadvantaged.241 
The anti-subordination principle would therefore require only a showing of 
disparate impact to render a statute illegitimate.   
 
Substantively onerous impacts, however, need not derive from conscious or 
un-conscious race-based motives.  Rule-based theories depend upon 
controlling police conduct by excluding illegitimate bias agent autonomy 
through deference to the legislated norms.  If the problem does not reside in 
executive bias then the legal liberal worry about illegitimate race- or class-
based animus does not exist, and the rule-based solution — replace caprice 
through legislation and remove autonomy through closely scrutinized 
prospective formal rules — will not help.     
 
1. Race-Neutral Legislation with Race-Specific 
Outcomes 
 
236 See, e.g., TONRY, supra note 1; COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 5. 
237 See, e.g. Angela Jordan Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of 
Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 18-19 (1998). 
238 See, e.g., TONRY, supra note 1, at 4-5, 123. 
239 Generally, the anti-subordination principle gains much of its traction from the notion of 
“unconscious racism,” “the ways in which our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs 
about race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions.” Charles R. Lawrence, 
III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious  Racism, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 317, 322 (1987).   Unconscious racism may result either from a conflict between our 
attitudes and our feelings of guilt towards those attitudes or from those beliefs, preferences 
and other social norms that structure a person’s “rational ordering of her perceptions of the 
world.”  Id. at 323. 
240 See, e.g., TONRY, supra note 1, at 4-5, 123. 
241 Dorothy Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, 
and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1434-35 (1991). 
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Randall Kennedy has provided a forceful critique of the claim that 
“unconscious racism” explains the real motivation of such legislation.  That 
critique is, I claim, consistent with the concept of formal legitimacy.  He 
conditions a finding of illegitimacy upon some showing of governmental racial 
animus.  That a distinct group bears the burden of a particular piece of 
legislation need not, he suggests, be explained by racism.  Race-neutral 
reasons may equally well explain the legislation.242 
The charge of racial animus, Kennedy has argued, is a weighty one that plays a 
particular role in discussions of legislative legitimacy.243 Demonstrating the 
racial animus of legislation requires more than a disparate effect on people of 
color, even against a (historical) background of discriminatory social norms.  
What more is required is a means of linking these background norms to the 
foreground of legislation and enforcement.  Race-neutral legislative or 
executive norms may result in race-specific disparate impacts.  Such an impact 
may be legitimate and justified — it may stem from the legislator’s belief that 
crack cocaine impacts minority communities in a manner that is different in 
kind to powder cocaine, and that the remedy of mass incarceration is necessary 
and tolerable to remedy the situation.244 Where some communities are more at 
risk during a drug epidemic, extreme measures may in fact be justified as to 
control the situation, despite our ability to foresee the detrimental collateral 
effects of such a policy.245 Kennedy points out that many African American 
lawmakers supported the drug laws.246 
Put simply, Kennedy notes that racial animus operates, under our 
constitutional structure, to render the legislative process illegitimate.247 So 
understood, racial animus is a “canceling condition”248 that negates the formal 
legitimacy of the legislative process; absent racial animus, however, the 
 
242 See, Kennedy, State & Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 1278; Stuntz, Race, Class & Drugs, 
supra note 2 at 1798.   
243 See Randall Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme 
Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1418-19 (1988). 
244 See, Kennedy, State & Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 1278; Stuntz, Race, Class & Drugs, 
supra note 2 at 1798.   
245 On foreseeability as an argument against the crack laws, see, e.g., TONRY, supra note 1, at 
4-5, 123. 
246 See, Kennedy, State & Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 1278; Stuntz, Race, Class & Drugs, 
supra note 2 at 1798.   
247 Kennedy, State & Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 1255-56.  This procedural account of the 
Equal Protection Clause comports with Paul Brest’s description of the “anti-discrimination 
principle” he takes to underlie its operation.  Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the 
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1976)  “The antidiscrimination 
principle fills a special need because — as even a glance at history indicates — race-
dependent decisions that are rational and purport to be based solely on legitimate 
considerations are likely in fact to rest on assumptions of the differential worth of racial 
groups or on the related phenomenon of racially selective sympathy and indifference.”  Id. 
248 See RAZ, supra note 113. 
ROLE-BASED POLICING 
40
process, so long as otherwise proper, is legitimate.  Kennedy further notes that 
legitimacy and justification are independent.249 Many of the individuals who 
supported the crack cocaine legislation believed disparate sentencing laws 
were substantively justified given the effect on the urban, minority 
communities they represented.250 That they no longer feel this way is 
indicative that the law’s underlying justification no longer applies.251 It does 
not, however, mean that such laws are formally illegitimate.  As Kennedy 
himself notes, “being wrong is different from being racist, and the difference is 
one that matters greatly.”252 Because courts are primarily empowered to 
pronounce only upon formal legitimacy, they are obliged to uphold the 
sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine absent a showing of 
racial animus during the legislative process.  The issue of justification is, 
according to Kennedy, for the legislature to determine.253 
But where formal legitimacy in the process of enactment is accompanied by 
subsequent substantive illegitimacy, due-process critiques lack a proper target.  
Where the focus is on the propriety of a piece of legislation, a race-based 
legitimacy crisis arises only if there is some race-based procedural impropriety 
during the enactment process manifested on the face of the statute or through 
some showing of animus.254 Absent such a showing, neither the content of the 
law nor its disparate effect is properly discussed in terms of legitimacy.255 
Indeed, Kennedy suggests, historically, it is the lack of enforcement that 
indicates racial animus: the police have, for race-based reasons, ignored the 
African American community to the latter’s detriment.256 The increased 
policing of the African American community in the wake of the War on 
Drugs, and particularly the emphasis on crack cocaine, suggests that 
enforcement agencies are finally acting in a non-racial manner.  Instead of 
ignoring minority communities, the police are at last treating them equally, in 
the same manner as white communities.257 
249 Kennedy, State & Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 1276-78. 
250 Id. at 1260-61; Randall Kennedy, A Response to Professor Cole's “Paradox of Race and 
Crime,” 83 GEO. L.J. 2573, 2575 (1995); David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal 
Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1295 (1995). 
251 Kennedy, State & Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 1277-78. 
252 Id. at 1278. 
253 Id.
254 A variety of commentators have expressed frustration with the ability of the Equal 
Protection Clause to solve problems of the racially disproportionate effects of the criminal 
law.  See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96
MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2025-28 (1998); Sklansky, supra note 250, at 1308-13.  
255 Kennedy, State & Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 1278. 
256 See KENNEDY, RACE & CRIME, supra note 3. 
257 See id.; Kennedy, State & Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 1256-57. 
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The absence of conscious or unconscious animus when enacting the legislation 
removes the rule-based claim that the legislative branch was illegitimately 
motivated by improper considerations.  During the legislative process, the 
government and the community are animated by a shared set of values.  That 
consensus subsequently disappears; nonetheless, given that the rule-based 
account of the scope of authority precisely demands adjudicative and 
executive deference to formally legitimate norms, the law enforcement 
apparatus is denied authority to ignore the law.  The only solution to a 
substantive mistake or change in circumstances is to re-legislate the law.  
 
Given that a formally legitimate statute may turn out to be substantively 
unjustified, the problem is what to do then.  The solution recommended 
through the anti-subordination principle — that the statute be deemed formally 
illegitimate once disparate impact on the basis of race is proved — cannot be 
justified as a claim of discrimination, whether conscious or unconscious.  If a 
race-neutral mistake in calculating the impact of the statute is to have the 
effect of a procedural flaw in its enactment, that claim properly must be 
understood as demanding a thoroughgoing program of redistributive justice 
based upon the effect of neutral laws on minority communities.258 I am not 
opposed to such a program: like Professor Kennedy, however, I believe we 
should be clear that the justification for such a program does not stem from 
deliberate racial animus. 
 
2. Race-Neutral Policing with Race-Specific Outcomes  
 
Kennedy’s race-neutral theory of motivation also applies in the realm of 
executive enforcement.  Liberal legal rule-based control depends, remember, 
upon legislative and adjudicative distrust of the police force’s capricious 
substitution of malign enforcement norms for formally legitimate ones.  
William Stuntz, Kennedy’s Harvard colleague, has, however, provided a race-
neutral justification for the disparate impact of precisely those policing 
practices that worry liberal legals.  If successful, such a justification would 
appear to similarly undermine the potency of the rule-based critique. 
 
Stuntz’s analysis depends in part upon distinguishes communities by the type 
of crime committed in “upscale” and “downscale” communities.  Two features 
in particular distinguish rich from poor crime; the crimes themselves and the 
level of “institutional” organization required to support the crimes.  The poor 
engage in burglary and auto theft; the rich embezzle and engage in insider 
 
258 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co.401 U.S. 424 (1971).  Such redistribution may be 
justified by the need to affirmatively undo historical discrimination.  Accordingly, I have a 
great deal of sympathy with Paul Butler’s identification of substantive injustice and 
suggestion that individuals may have a moral duty to disregard the law in certain 
circumstances.  See, e.g., Butler, Jury Nullification, supra note 6.  I have some problem with 
some aspects of his proposed solution that need not detain us here. 
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trading.259 Poor crime requires networks to receive, launder, and distribute 
stolen goods; rich crime does not.  Poor crime thus requires a criminal 
community and a criminal market in order to work efficiently; rich crime does 
not.  Poor crimes are relatively institutionalized, with different people holding 
a variety of normatively structured positions in the criminal enterprise; rich 
crimes are much more atomistic.260 
Where crime is socially structured (by social networks or markets), destructive 
of the fabric of community cohesiveness, and conducted in the open, practices 
that involve prominent invasions into everyday behavior may be 
appropriate.261 Where crime is atomistic, less harmful to the community’s 
fabric, and conducted behind closed doors in the criminal’s office or home, 
more discreet practices are required.  Class bias does not render such 
difference formally or substantively illegitimate so long as the different types 
of crimes, rich and poor, are qualitatively distinct.  If rich and poor crime is 
properly incomparable across social and geographic communities, then 
different enforcement practices are substantively justified given the 
community-specific and location-driven availability of more or less private 
spaces for crime.262 
It is worth emphasizing that, for Stuntz, differential enforcement need not be a 
product of racism (and therefore formal or substantively illegitimate) but of 
class differences that produce or exacerbate substantively legitimate 
differences in policing rich and poor communities.263 This is as true for drug 
crime as for other socially and economically stratified crimes.  Sociological 
features of the disparate drug-using communities,264 however, engender 
divergences in the organization of drug markets in upscale and downscale 
communities.265 Differences in the quality and price of different drugs stratify 
the market by class; thanks to social features of urban poverty, class 
stratification entails racial stratification.266 Accordingly, the difference in 
policing public, socially structured and private, atomistic communities has a 
racially disparate impact. 
 
259 Stuntz, Race, Class & Drugs, supra note 2 at 1803. 
260 Id. at 1802. 
261 Id. at 1813-15; Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, supra note 2 at 1875-76. 
262 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Punishment Incommensurability, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691, 
694-96 (1998) (discussing social meaning of different crimes and criminal sanctions in terms 
of incommensurability); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 591, 620-21 (1996) (discussing qualitative expressive differences between crimes).  
263 Stuntz, Race, Class & Drugs, supra note 2 at 1803; Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, supra 
note 2 at 1877. 
264 Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, supra note 2 at 1877. 
265 See KENNEDY, RACE & CRIME, supra note 3. 
266 Stuntz, Race, Class & Drugs, supra note 2 at 1805-06; Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 
supra note 2 at 1874-79. 
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Thus, despite similarities in the type of crime, the different communities 
experience different quantities and qualities of law enforcement based upon 
the relative expense and availability of policing strategies.  Where the drug 
market remains indoors and atomistic, investigation proceeds by means of 
electronic surveillance and targeted busts; where it is public and social, 
investigation relies on stop-and-frisks.267 Furthermore, upscale users tend — 
through necessity or choice — to find their drugs through social networks of 
suppliers, dealers, and buyers in downscale communities.268 
This again is to insist upon the shared values of the police and the 
communities they police.  Both wish the neighborhood to be rid of drug 
dealers and free of violence.  Accordingly, the police choose the most effective 
means to police public spaces, and that choice is determined by considerations 
derived from their professional expertise and expressive of tactical efficiency 
rather than malign race- or class-based values.  In other words, the rule-based 
charge of bias and caprice will not stick.  Instead, role-based considerations 
justify the tactics chosen. 
 
Nonetheless, because there is some overlap between markets,269 race-neutral 
motivations in the style of policing and minority populations are internalized 
by minority target groups as intentional; such perceptions are reinforced by 
different enforcement techniques that, in the poor, urban communities in 
which many minority targets live, interfere with the daily life of the law-
abiding as well as law-breakers.270 These non-normative discrepancies thus 
obtain, by virtue of their translation through internalization, a negative 
normative impact that undermines the legitimacy of the drug laws and the 
government that enforces those laws.271 The charge that race-based 
differences in enforcement are the product of racial animus is thus wrong as a 
matter of fact, but understandable: thanks to the social stratification of many 
communities by class and race, that perception of illegitimacy is exacerbated.  
 
3. Social Norms, Local Participation, and Public Order 
Policing 
 
Social norms theorists agree with the legal liberal contention that, prior to the 
Warren Court revolution in criminal justice, the police were often animated by 
institutional or individual racist caprice.272 Law enforcement officials used a 
variety of vaguely drafted public order laws to discriminate against minorities 
 
267 Stuntz, Race, Class & Drugs, supra note 2 at 1821. 
268 Id. at 1809. 
269 Id. at 1812-13. 
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 See Livingston, Communities, supra note 10, at 596-97; Kahan & Meares, Crisis, supra 
note 1, at 1156-57; Meares, supra note 77, at 1344-47. 
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and answered to a political bureaucracy that was itself segregated and 
segregationist.273 Social norms theorists accept that the Warren Court was 
correct to be skeptical of police discretion operating as a cover for 
discrimination and to engage in a rule-based limitation upon the scope of 
police (and lower court) authority.274 
Times change, however.  Nowadays both the police and the municipal 
administrations to which they answer are integrated and often run by 
minorities.275 The problem is no longer racially motivated executive discretion 
but, first, the lengthy sentences imposed for drug crimes and, second, drug 
policing targeted upon poor, urban, minority communities already struggling 
to cope with a variety of other social issues.276 The solution is to curtail a 
policing style aimed at arrest and incarceration, and in its place develop a style 
designed to control the sort of open-air, low-level anti-social behavior 
common across racially diverse communities.277 The goal is to facilitate direct 
engagement between local government and the neighborhood community, so 
as to strengthen community bonds to enable neighborhoods to police 
themselves.  Public order policing encourages “law-abiders to engage in 
behavior — from patrolling the streets, to cooperating with police, to 
transmitting law-abiding values to youths — that themselves suppress crime. 
The same effects can likely be achieved by cooperative alliances between the 
police and community associations.”278 
273 See Livingston, Communities, supra note 10, at 596-97; Meares, supra note 77, at 1344-
47.
274 See Meares, supra note 77, at 1344-47. 
275 See, e.g., Kennedy, State & Criminal Law, supra note 3, 1258 ( discussing 
“African-Americans’ . . . efforts to reform and participate in the creation and 
implementation of government policy . . . [undertaken by] black mayors, 
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animus of and minority participation in legislation substantially anticipates the 
major points of the social norms theorists.  See Kahan & Meares, Crisis, supra 
note 1, at 1162 “(African-Americans today make up a significant percentage of 
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276 Meares, Katyal & Kahan, supra note 215, at 1190-91; Meares, Legitimacy & Law, supra 
note 28, at 398; Meares & Kahan, Norms, supra note 8, at 818-819; Meares, Social 
Organization, supra note 10, at 226. 
277 See Meares, Social Organization, supra note 10, at 224; Meares, supra note 77, at 1345-
49.
278 Meares & Kahan, Norms, supra note 8, at 827; see also Meares, Social Organization, 
supra note 10, at 220-26 (discussing reverse stings and anti-gang ordinances); Meares, 
Policing, supra note 15, at 1612 (same). 
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From the social norms perspective, legitimacy inheres in local endorsement of 
police practices rather than formal adherence to the letter of the law.279 The 
desires of the community — for public order, for an increased police presence, 
to remove gangs and control delinquency, and generally improve quality of 
life — are fundamental.  The goal is to empower adults through formal and 
informal regular interactions — styled as “friendship networks”280 — 
supporting public displays of law-abidingness and emphasizing acceptable 
limits on public conduct,281 and bolstered in this effort by the police.282 Broad 
anti-discrimination principles are matched by strong discretion at the local 
level to enable enforcement to target particular individuals, places, or 
practices.283 Local participation by minority residents in endorsing such 
strategies enforces the presumption of anti-discrimination and includes local 
communities in the creation and enforcement of the law,284 “enhanc[ing] the 
cultural organization of a community around law-abiding behavior.”285 
279 Meares, Policing, supra note 15, at 1606-07.
280 Id.; Meares, Social Organization, supra note 10, at 218, 225; Meares, 
Connections, supra note 10, at 593; Kahan & Meares, Crisis, supra note 1, at 
1164 (1998); Meares & Kahan, Norms, supra note 8, at 811-12. 
281 The type of program contemplated by social norms theorist can be quite ambitious: 
we might imagine government programs that are more directly in the 
business of creating linkages among individuals in a neighborhood, or 
involving individuals in community institutions. We might even imagine 
programs involving individuals in organizations and bringing together 
community organizations and institutions that typically have little to do with 
one another for the purpose of helping children and addressing crime. Such 
programs involve rethinking relatively traditional approaches to law 
enforcement in terms of social-organization improvement. 
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03. “The role of social organization in nourishing community's own self-policing capacity 
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In this form of “empowered democracy,”286 policing operates to enable and 
persuade individuals to engage in the promotion of public order, and in turn 
participates in and is legitimated by local formal and informal social 
networks.287 Central to this enterprise are public attitudes of trust in the police 
and belief that they are enforcing the law in a neutral and respectful manner.288 
Social norms theorists are thus concerned with police legitimacy as 
demonstrating impartiality and engendering public confidence in law-
enforcement. The emphasis is on persuasion rather than punishment.289 
Sanction-based regimes are antithetical to creation of trust and destroy the 
fabric of already fragile at-risk communities.   
 
This vision of law-enforcement legitimacy has formal and substantive 
elements.  It is formal where the creation or maintenance of legitimacy is 
process-oriented, dependent upon local participation in developing law-
enforcement norms and a reciprocal attitude of respect from the police.  It is 
substantive because what is proposed is a “new politics” of local “empowered” 
or “deliberative” democracy justifying the various measures designed to 
enhance law enforcement.290 
286 FUNG, supra note 213; see also Archon Fung, Deliberative Democracy, Chicago-Style: 
Grass-roots Governance in Policing and Public Education, in DEEPENING DEMOCRACY:
INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE (Archon Fung 
and Erik Olin Wright, eds. 2003) (hereinafter Fung, Deliberative Democracy). 
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refers to the extent to which a perceiver believes that the authority in question will act fairly 
and benevolently in the future.” Meares, Legitimacy & Law, supra note 28, at 403-04.    This 
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minor changes in Meares, supra note 55, at 412-13 (“‘Standing’ refers to an individual's 
membership in a social group.  If the group is treated with dignity and respect, the individuals 
are likely to conclude that the authority recognizes their membership and status within the 
group.  ‘Neutrality’ refers to the absence of bias or discrimination against the group and 
suggests that different groups will be treated alike.  ‘Trust’ is the individual's belief that the 
authority will act not only fairly but also predictably in the future.”). 
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The goal is to create “preventative partnerships”291 in which police enlist 
community help in responding to crime rates and adapting to the new realities 
of crime.  So long as the police partner with the community to create 
substantive criminal law or identify the targets of policing, then discretion is 
appropriately constrained.  As NYU Law School criminologist David Garland 
describes, in his magisterial discussion of changes in policing and punishment 
over the past thirty-five years, the buzz words for this form of organization 
are: “‘partnership,’ ‘public/private alliance,’ ‘inter-agency cooperation,’ ‘the 
multi-agency approach,’ ‘activating communities’…and the ‘co-production of 
security’”:292 all of these emphasize that crime control requires a joint effort, 
whether between criminal justice agencies themselves, or those agencies and 
the public.  Hand in hand with this emphasis on pooling of resources is a focus 
on responsiveness and reflexivity, both at the institutional and community 
levels.293 Throughout this changed approach to crime control, state 
organizations retain a certain primacy, but operate to steer, rather than carry 
out, the functions of crime control: “[t]he state’s new strategy is not to 
command and control, but rather to persuade and align, to organize, to ensure 
that other actors play their part.”294 
Local community participation at the point of legislation — creating the 
various local ordinances and other “laws on the books” used to establish youth 
curfews or enjoin pan-handling — that the police then enforce, is formally 
legitimate in that participation in the legislative process is insufficient to 
ensure that the norms as legislated are substantively justified.295 Police 
reciprocation and respect at the point of enforcement also provides a formally 
legitimate justification: it is independent of the substantive outcome296 and 
depends upon the manner in which the government interacts with its citizens 
or the larger groups to which they belong or with which they identify.297 
291 GARLAND, supra note 105, at 16. 
292 Id. at 124. 
293 See, e.g., id. at 117 (“bureaucracies of the criminal justice system have had 
to become more responsive, more attuned to the interests of individual 
consumers and stakeholders, and less assured in their definition of what 
constitutes the public interest.”). 
294 Id. at 126. 
295 See Solum, supra note 19, at 265-67.  Participation may, however, ensure a substantively 
justified institution, as democratic participation ensures that certain legislative processes are 
substantively justified as deliberative bodies.  The substantive legitimacy of a deliberative, 
legislative body does not guarantee that it will enact substantively legitimate — that is, fully 
justified — laws. 
296 Meares, Legitimacy & Law, supra note 28, at 402. 
297 See Meares, Katyal & Kahan, supra note 215, at 1195; Meares, supra note 55, at 412-13; 
Meares, Legitimacy & Law, supra note 28, at 403-04 
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Social norms theorists often provide what appears to be an aesthetic goal for 
executive encounters with the public: the police embark on a “charm 
offensive” in which they are more “polite” to arrestees,298 in order to replace 
signals indicating government disinterest with those expressing government 
interest299 and to persuade communities that they are being policed for their 
own benefit.300 Substantively legitimate programs of community policing, 
however, require more than polite interactions between police and public 
during their various encounters on the street.  Rather, preventative partnering 
requires some more thoroughgoing effort to generate community interest and 
facilitate police-public interactions.  This is more than a matter of mere 
politeness: it requires a revolution in police civic engagement.301 
B. Reframing the Issues
The problem facing liberal legal theories depending upon a due-process 
critique is that the lack of animus at the input-end of both legislation and 
enforcement renders the process of legislating and policing formally 
legitimate.  From a rule-based point of view, the police and the courts are 
required to follow the law.  So long as there was no procedural impropriety in 
the law-creating process, the substantive moral, political, economic, etc., effect 
of the law is immaterial.  Any challenge to the law must usually rest upon the 
procedure by which it was enacted, not the value of the norm as enforced.  The 
absence of animus operates to undermine the rule-based, legal liberal claim of 
illegitimacy. 
 
The problem facing facing Kennedy and Stuntz, as well as social norms 
theorists, is, however, twofold: first, as a sociological matter, the communities 
perceive differences in enforcement as unjust; and second, as a normative 
matter, these differences are in fact be substantively unjust: the assumptions 
underlying both legislation and enforcement have changed to such a degree as 
no longer to provide a full justification for the laws.   
 
It turns out that the addictive quality and crimogenic effect of crack is little 
different from powder,302 and the remedy of mass incarceration is 
intolerable.303 The justifications for disparate penalties on crack cocaine users 
 
298 Meares, Katyal & Kahan, supra note 215, at 1195, 1197; Meares, Legitimacy & Law, 
supra note 28, at 403. 
299 Livingston, supra note 74, at 586. 
300 See Meares, supra note 55; Meares, Legitimacy & Law, supra note 28, at 402-03; Meares, 
Social Organization, supra note 10, at 214. 
301 FUNG, supra note 213. 
302 Joseph E. Kennedy, Drug Wars in Black and White, 66-SUM LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
153, 178-79 (2003). 
303 TONRY, supra note 1, at 97 (“The problem with the rationale of the War on Drugs as an 
exercise in moral education is that it destroyed lives of young, principally minority people in 
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— an exercise in moral education;304 “that crack use inevitably destroyed the 
lives of those using it”;305 that the use of crack “was expanding beyond the 
ghetto” into the white community;306 “that blacks as a class may be helped by 
measures reasonably thought to discourage [crack use]”307 — no longer 
apply.308 The only reason that appears to explain the continued attitude to the 
drug policy is a race-based one.309 
The liberal emphasis on disparate outcomes identifies a real problem; the 
different interests and priorities of the legislative and target communities.  The 
latter does not experience the brunt of the enforcement practices, negative or 
positive, and so remains free to ignore them.  Accordingly, the formal 
illegitimacy inheres, not in some race-based animus motivating legislation and 
enforcement, but in the discovered substantive illegitimacy of that legislation 
combined with a formal inability to cure the substantive problem. If the 
process is illegitimate, that is not due to motivational animus but “democratic 
domination” of the target community by some other group — a group that 
does not care what happens to the target community and refuses or neglects to 
re-legislate the malign, illegitimate norms.310 
This malign neglect presents a serious legitimacy problem: if the law is in fact, 
illegitimate, why should anyone follow it?  It would be morally wrong to do 
so, unless the weight of some (moral) obligation to obey the law trumps the 
public’s obligation to avoid committing a moral wrong.311 Although the police 
and courts are required to enforce formally legitimate norms, the public’s 
obligation to obey the law is dependant upon the substantive legitimacy of the 
laws that are enacted.312 If the government does not repeal a law it knows is 
substantively illegitimate, that suggests — as a sociological and evaluative 
matter — that the government is willing to act immorally.  And if the law is 
 
order to reinforce existing norms of young, mostly majority people.”).  See id. at 123 (“The 
willingness of the drug war’s planners to sacrifice young black Americans cannot be 
justified.”) 
304 TONRY, supra note 1, at 97. 
305 Kennedy, supra note 302, at 178. 
306 Sklansky, supra note 250, at 1294. 
307 Kennedy, State & Criminal Law, supra note 3, 1268. 
308 See Paul Butler, By Any Means Necessary: Using Violence and Subversion to Change 
Unjust Law, 50 UCLA L. REV. 721, 745-736 (2003) (noting that Congressional Black 
Caucus, NAACP, Urban League and U.S. Sentencing Commission “found that there was little 
rationale” for the differential treatment of crack cocaine).  Justice Stephens, in remarks to the 
American Bar Association, has made a similar point about mandatory minimum sentences. 
309 See Sklansky, supra note 250, at 1294. 
310 See Butler, Jury Nullification, supra note 6 at 711 (citing DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM 
AND AMERICAN LAW 177 (3d ed. 1992)) 
311 Hence, the classic maxim of natural law theory coined by Thomas Acquinas and most 
recently elaborated by John Finnis, lex inustia non est lex. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND 
NATURAL RIGHTS (1980). 
312 See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 113. 
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targeted only at particular citizens, the government acts in a doubly 
illegitimate manner by enforcing substantively unjust norms in a formally 
discriminatory manner.313 
The existence of a legitimacy crisis thus hinges on the trumping of formal 
legitimacy by substantive illegitimacy sufficient to undermine some general 
public respect for the legal system.  For a discrete patchwork of communities 
throughout the nation, the government has, through disparate police practices 
tied to a history of racial discrimination, already forfeited that respect and is 
now (paradoxically) trying to regain it through the disparate enforcement of 
unjustified and substantively illegitimate laws.314 
Both Stuntz and Kennedy acknowledge the difficulty of finding some effective 
solution to the legitimacy crisis.  They adopt the approach recommended by 
President Grant on the occasion of his First Inaugural Address: “Laws are to 
govern all alike — those opposed as well as those who favor them.  I know no 
method to secure the repeal of bad or obnoxious laws so effective as their 
stringent execution.”315 Stuntz expressly and Kennedy more qualifiedly 
endorse a leveling up of crime enforcement so that rich, suburban whites are 
policed in the same manner as poor urban African Americans.  I, however, 
believe as a practical matter that such an approach is politically unlikely and 
normatively unnecessary.   
 
Social norms theories face a slightly different objection.  They rely upon 
indicia of increased local minority participation to justify the process that 
produces youth curfew and anti-gang ordinances.  There is, however, a 
somewhat complex relation between legislation, law enforcement, and 
legitimacy.  Even at the local level, the crime-ridden neighborhood may be 
separated from the body politic in a variety of ways, including flight of the 
more affluent members of the community, school zoning, and incarceration — 
all of which reduces the crime-ridden community’s social and legislative 
capital (and places in question the motives of the fleeing, zoning, affluent 
community).   
 
As Kennedy316 Mears,317 and others have noted, the African American 
community is not a monolith: “the stereotyping of African Americans 
generally, and African American men in particular, as criminals leads to 
distrust within communities — Reverend Jesse Jackson is not unique among 
 
313 See Butler, Jury Nullification, supra note 6. 
314 Or only partially justified, and then only from the point of view of a legal system that has 
historically forfeited its claim to treat minorities in an equal and so formally legitimate 
manner. 
315 Ulysses S. Grant, First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1869). 
316 Kennedy, State & Criminal Law, supra note 3. 
317 Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 689-90. 
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African Americans in fearing victimization by young African American 
men.”318 Social and class differences may separate geographically proximate 
and racially comparable communities.319 Those who bear the brunt of crime 
may not be those who bear the brunt of policing, and vice versa.  Rather, it 
may be more affluent communities on the fringes of disorderly ones — the 
“next-door” neighborhoods —that are able to legislate laws targeted at the 
neighborhood level.320 
Youth curfews and anti-gang ordinances are, on this explanation, popular 
because they reflect adjoining, relatively affluent beliefs about their next-door 
neighborhoods.  The perception of poor urban youth as inherently dangerous 
then justifies the targeting of such individuals by the criminal justice system, 
although better, more effective policies may be available.  Fear of next-door 
neighborhoods may militate against social welfare policies because the target 
community is characterized part of the undeserving poor.321 That judgment in 
turn depends upon the social norms used to categorize and evaluate such 
communities as using the crime-centered assessments of risk, deviancy, and 
desert.322 
Both the legislative and executive formal elements of legitimacy, however, 
depend upon substantive considerations of reciprocity between government 
and citizen.  Under the notion of empowered democracy,323 the law, if it is to 
be substantively legitimate, depends upon a reciprocal attitude of respect from 
the government combined with group participation in a neutral legal 
process.324 Reciprocity indicates that the government takes seriously the 
citizen’s participation in the process.  At the level of legislation, the process is 
substantively legitimate if it does in fact maximize public participation in the 
 
318 Meares & Kahan, Norms, supra note 8, at 818; see also Meares, Social Organization, 
supra note 10, at 218 (“Reverend Jesse Jackson is not unique among African Americans in 
fearing victimization by young African-American men.  Neighborly distrust leads to greater 
atomization of African Americans in poor communities.”). 
319 See Meares, Social Organization, supra note 10, at 218. 
320 Id. 
321 See, e.g. Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare 
Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719 (1992); Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: 
Conflicting Definitions from Welfare "Reform," Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 688 (1988); Dorothy Roberts, The Value of Black Mothers' Work, 26 CONN. L. REV.
871 (1994). 
322 Jonathan Simon suggests that the criminal law now has a central role in the political 
creation and organization of communities.  The process of legislating criminal laws 
encourages a form of political participation premised upon the idealization of criminal and 
victim, see Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime Metaphors, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 1035, 
1042 (2002); Jonathan Simon, Megan's Law: Crime And Democracy In Late Modern 
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creation and enforcement of criminal-law norms through a fair and inclusive 
process. The goal of the process is to increase formal legitimacy through more 
and devolved participation in the regulatory process, and so increase the 
underlying substantive legitimacy of the institution.  But, it bears repeating, a 
formally legitimate process of legislation by a substantively justified 
institution may still produce substantively unjust outcomes, whether 
deliberately or through neglect. 
 
Paul Butler makes precisely this demand for the substantive legitimacy of the 
democratic process.  For Butler, formal legitimacy is unimportant if it is no 
more than propaganda operating to induce compliance to substantively unjust 
drug laws in a discriminated-against community.  In such circumstances, he 
suggests, African American are substantively justified in engaging in direct 
action to replace or reject substantively unjust laws,325 and has famously (or 
notoriously) argued for jury nullification of non-violent drug crimes because 
of the race-based effect of the War on Drugs.326 Butler frames this type of 
disregard for unjust laws as a sort of “affirmative action” or, in my terms, 
substantive justice for poor, African American drug users.327 
Thus, even where the politically active residents of the target neighborhood 
endorse measures including curfews and loitering ordinances, it is not clear 
that they do so on the self-understanding that these are the best solutions to 
their problems.  Local residents may generally agree that the solution to gang 
activity or juvenile drug dealing is to increase child-care facilities and after-
school programs and engage in mentoring activities with at-risk youth.  Due to 
a lack of social capital such options, and others like them, are unavailable.328 
Extreme measures may appear inviting, especially when it is clear that these 
are ones the executive will, in fact, enforce.329 Such measures may appear 
especially attractive when the more socially engaged members of the target 
neighborhood increase their “social capital”330 across communities through 
their sponsorship of such measures.331 Participation alone, however, neither 
 
325 See Butler, supra note 308, at 737 (“‘Minority participation in pluralist politics can, of 
course, take the form of voting, running for office, or making campaign contributions, but it is 
not limited to those forms of involvement.  Minority participation can also take the form of 
demonstrations, boycotts, and riots.’”) (quoting Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH.
L. REV. 1971, 1992- 93 (1990)). 
326 See Butler, Jury Nullification, supra note 6; Butler, supra note 5; Paul Butler, Race-Based 
Jury Nullification: Surrebuttal, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 933 (1997). 
327 Butler, Affirmative Action, supra note 6. 
328 Butler, supra note 5, at 156. 
329 Fung would suggest that part of empowering local communities is alerting them to the 
availability of these other options. FUNG, supra note 213; see also Fung, supra note 286.  As I 
make clear in the next section, the police may have a vested interest in not so doing.   
330 See, e.g. Meares, Legitimacy & Law, supra note 28, at 402-03. 
331 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980). 
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justifies such laws nor suggests that they are optimal solutions to the problem 
at hand.332 Instead, the solution lies in the concept of role-based authority. 
 
V. DISCRETION, AUTONOMY, AND HIGH-STAKES ESCALATION
The real issues in the debate between social norms theorists and legal liberals 
are the extent to which the criminal law is substantively legitimate and the 
manner in which police power is responsive to local demands to reject 
enforcement of substantively illegitimate laws.  Social norms theorists claims 
that locally rather than remotely generated and enforced standards provide the 
solution to the community control of law-enforcement.  There are, however, 
inherent difficulties in that form of regulation, ones that can be explained, 
ironically enough, using the basic concepts of social norms theory.  Even at 
the local level, so long as police are motivated by their own internal and local 
values different from those entertained by the community, they are likely to 
respond to general standards in a manner different from the community.  The 
likelihood that the police will then willingly separate investigative and 
preventative roles is reduced, and the goal of empowering the police to engage 
in low-level interactions serve only to increase the arsenal available for the 
police to wage the high-stakes policing that is part of the War on Drugs. 
 
The social norms approach to legitimacy — empowered democracy — relies 
heavily upon an interest in local governance and neighborhood social 
organization; not all social norms theories take a similar interest in police self-
governance and police organization.333 There are a range of true believers and 
fellow travelers, variously described as legal pragmatism,334 norm focused 
scholarship”; the “New Chicago School”;335 and the “new discretion 
scholars,”336 each using the concept of social norms for different purposes.  
 
332 In the long run, it may serve to undercut the authority of the enacting social authorities 
among the target group now feeling the brunt of the policy.  Participation is not, in itself, a 
guarantor of substantive legitimacy.  See, e.g, Solum, supra note 19, at 265-67; see also 
Harcourt, supra note 7, at 179 (discussing need for more research into which of the social 
norms programs do in fact work). 
333 Debra Livingston is an exception in this regard.  See Debra Livingston, The Unfulfilled 
Promise of Citizen Review, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 653 (2004); Livingston, Caretaking, supra 
note 10. 
334 Simon, supra note 7, at 48-74 (describing social norms theorists as legal pragmatists). 
335 Harcourt, supra note 7. 
336 Cole, Discretion, supra note 8, at 1062.  Cole emphasizes discretion both because it is a 
common response by the various scholars under discussion, though particularly the Chicago 
and Columbia schools.  His response is to control discretion through clear, mandatory norms.  
He thus participates in a tradition of what might be called “legalism scholars” that would 
include LaFave, Amsterdam, and Davis.  Because I suggest that the “newness”  of the new 
discretion is its focus on community standards of behavior — social norms — and am 
sympathetic to, but dubious of, the efficacy of legalistic responses as the only solution to the 
issues he identifies, I prefer to emphasize the social and normative aspects of the scholarship. 
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The distinction I wish to draw in this section is between those scholars 
predominantly associated with the New Chicago School, particularly Tracey 
Meares and Dan Kahan, who believe low-level policing is a panacea for 
negative impact of the War on Drugs and those others, predominantly Debra 
Livingston but also William Stuntz,337 who have reservations about that 
solution.  
 
New Chicago theorists appear interested in the internal workings of the police, 
if at all, primarily to show that departments or officers are not motivated by 
racial animus.  Their real interest, however, is in community social 
organization.  Policing is to be at the service of local communities free to 
bargain for neighborhood standards and targets of policing without county, 
state, or national interference.  Livingston is far more interested in the variety 
of roles allotted to the police, the tendency of those roles to blur, and the 
different constraints — both institutional and constitutional — upon those 
roles.  In their different ways, these social norms theorists demand, not for 
freedom from rule-based constraints, so much as a recalibration of control 
through the separation of distinct police roles: investigation and prevention.   
 
A. Discretion and Autonomy: Empowering Local Democracy
No matter the source or sweep of legislative norms (whether at the 
neighborhood, city, county, state, or national level) for rules to guide executive 
behavior they must be both comprehensible without further instruction338 and 
the executive must enforce them in a “transparent” manner — that is, without 
adding its own values into the mix.  The social norms promotion of 
“discretion” and rejection of broad rules should thus be recast as a distrust of, 
not rules generally, but rules with a certain source and scope.   
 
The social norms thesis is essentially that rule-based constraints on law-
enforcement only work if they are sufficiently local, specific, and 
contextualized.339 General norms of constraint — those with constitutional 
force and national sweep — ought to be used only to exclude impermissible 
values such as racial bias in the legislation and enforcement of laws.340 Where 
the police are concerned, rather than operating to constrain the scope of 
authority, general norms are better used to carve out a range of positive powers 
 
337 Who might best be characterized as a fellow traveler. 
338 According to H.L.A. Hart, an essential feature of systems of law is their ability to guide 
conduct by providing “general standards of conduct, which multitudes of individuals could 
understand, without further direction, as requiring from them certain conduct when occasion 
arose.”  HART, supra note 31, at 121.  Lon Fuller’s concept of “social ordering” makes 
substantially the same point.  See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964); Lon L. 
Fuller, The Forms And Limits Of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 357 (1978). 
339 Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 690. 
340 Livingston, Communities, supra note 10, at 608-27; Meares, supra note 77, at 1344-47. 
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for the police.  What social norms scholars propose is not so much discretion 
as autonomy: not the absence of rules regulating and constraining behavior, 
but the presence of social and institutional guidelines, regulations, and norms 
defining (positively) the role of the police.   Their point is to relocate of the 
power to generate those rules from inside to outside the law — from legal to 
social norms — and down from national, state, or county authorities and into 
the local community.  Empowered autonomy envisages the police and 
community in partnership negotiating law-enforcement strategies as 
independent, self-directed entities each with respect for the dignity and 
identity of the other.341 
This feature of guidance by rules results in what might be called a locally rule-
based approach on the part of social norms theorists and undermines the claim 
that they approve thoroughgoing police discretion.  Both Meares342 and 
Livingston343 in fact support constraint of police conduct through local 
guidelines of the sort recommended by Amsterdam and other legal liberals.344 
While law enforcement officials can always choose to interpret the local law 
enforcement initiatives in idiosyncratic ways,345 transparent guidelines can 
provide some limit on police power, and can increase legitimacy through ready 
availability and good-faith enforcement.346 
National, state, or even county control347 rule-based constraint pertain only to 
certain general participation-promoting (and so anti-discrimination) values.348 
Police authority is rather to be more precisely limited by specific, local 
constraints upon permissible action, developed in partnership with or 
responsive to the local community and its standards.349 That partnership 
posture promotes institutional autonomy.  The police are required to negotiate 
with local communities as allies, experts, and advisors, and on occasion act so 
 
341 KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY (2005). 
342 Meares, supra note 77, at 1348-39. 
343 See Livingston, Communities, supra note 10, at 658-663 (“the use of departmental 
guidelines: broad policy statements developed within the police department that seek to 
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344 See id. at 659-660 (comparing legal liberal emphasis on guidelines with social norms 
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supra note 164, at 423; Gerald M. Caplan, The Case for Rulemaking by Law Enforcement 
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Cops: A Legislative Approach to Police Rulemaking, 63 U. DET. MERCY  L. REV. 361, 
365366 & n.33 (1986). 
345 See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 27, at 173; Livingston, supra note 74.  The worry here is 
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346 See Livingston, supra note 74. 
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as to overcome local self-interest or bias.350 The goal is to develop 
institutional self-conceptions (and understandings of the relationship between 
law-enforcement and community) that reorient policing towards a new, more 
preventative role.351 
The foundations of this process of community-police regulation — dignity, 
respect, and trust — are captured by the concept of autonomy.  Autonomy has 
both a social and a normative strand: it accepts that individuals, institutions, 
and communities are socially situated within a history and locality, but 
recognizes that these entities can take a range of evaluative attitudes to their 
social situation that have normative consequences.  Accordingly, autonomous 
or autonomy-respecting relationships consist in dialogue rather than demand, 
appreciative that the other has certain goals and identifications that must be 
respected even if they are ultimately to be rejected.352 
This concept of two autonomous entities engaged in mutually beneficial 
dialogue fits the community-creating form of policing premised on reciprocal 
relationships of trust and respect.353 Recently Dan Kahan has suggested that, 
“individuals in collective action settings behave not like rational wealth 
maximizers but rather like moral and emotional reciprocators.  When they 
perceive that other individuals are voluntarily contributing to public goods, 
most individuals are moved by honor, generosity, and like dispositions to do 
the same.”354 In an atmosphere of distrust, individuals will engage in non-
cooperation, even at some cost to themselves.355 In the context of public-order 
policing, the issue is whether “community residents and police [will] 
contribute to the collective good of cooperation and respect or 
instead … approach one another with suspicion and animosity.”356 Order-
maintenance policing thus directly and indirectly benefits communities 
through creating trust between police and residents and promoting 
guardianship and friendship networks that better enable the public to police 
 
350 See Livingston, supra note 74; FUNG, supra note 213. 
351 See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 27; Livingston, supra note 74. 
352 See APPIAH, supra note 341. 
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354 Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner's Law and Social 
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Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 71-72 (2003) 
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354, at 1514-15. 
356 Kahan, Collective Action, supra note 354, at 1514-15.  Kahan continues, “As in other 
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themselves without incarcerating large numbers of minority drug users as part 
of the War on Drugs.357 
In their preventative role, police on the beat are expected to engage in a large 
degree of self-regulation, eschewing the temptation to escalate low-level 
encounters into a punitive style of drug enforcement.358 Legitimacy thus 
depends not upon rule-based constraint but upon police willingness to adopt a 
limited, preventative, and community oriented role.  Citizen review operates at 
the beginning of the process, to develop appropriate guidelines or identify 
places and people in need of increased police care, and continues not as a post-
hoc sanction to punish police misconduct, but as a means of evaluating and 
redirecting police performance and police-community goals.359 The operating 
principles are “persuasion”360 and “[t]rust”…the individual's belief that the 
authority will act not only fairly but also predictably in the future.”361 The 
police are therefore to be treated with the same respect and autonomy with 
which they are expected to treat the public. 
 
B. Police Enforcement Practices and Internalization of Legal Norms
There are a variety of possible critiques of a program that replaces broad city, 
county, or national standards with a patchwork quilt of crime zones, each 
enforcing different standards of behavior and some prohibiting the exercise of 
innocent or constitutionally protected conduct.  One I wish to suggest is that 
divergence between general and local norms may be replicated at the local 
level by divergence between local and institutional norms.  In fact, the 
concepts of social meaning and social influence provide a ready account of 
such variances, and experience suggests the profound consequences even 
when policing “only” low-level crime. 
 
To elaborate the manner in which local police and community interests may 
diverge despite local partnerships, it is worth reminding ourselves of some of 
 
357 See id. at 1529; Meares, Policing, supra note 15, at 1606; Meares, Social 
Organization, supra note 10, at 223-24; Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, 
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360 Meares, Legitimacy & Law, supra note 28, at 404; Meares, supra note 55, at 413 (“A 
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the ways in which social norms theorists believe norms are internalized, and to 
place them in the context of theories of norms more generally.  While that 
account provides further ammunition against rule-based constraints upon 
policing, it also suggests that the police are likely to take advantage of their 
ability to shift roles when engaging in public order policing to suit their own 
administrative agenda.  Such considerations do not undermine the concept of 
role-based restraints but suggest a radical re-thinking of the how, if not the 
why, of community policing.  
 
1. Social Meaning, Social Influence, and Institutional 
Conduct 
 
The concept of social meaning suggests that, generally, we understand a norm 
against the background set and structure of norms that we have variously 
internalized.362 The manner in which the norm is placed within an agent’s set 
of values, goals, and beliefs — its social meaning — may be different from its 
legislated meaning — the values, goals, and beliefs entertained by the law-
maker.  The intermediary of social meaning can break link between legislated 
norms and social norms and render opaque the manner in which the legislated 
norm will be adopted by the prosecutor or the police.  The relative social 
influence of the norm determines how forceful and widespread such a rupture 
will be. 
 
The problem is that the social meaning of a norm — its value for a particular 
subject — generates different degrees of social influence.  Legal liberal 
solutions to executive law enforcement, though all too aware of administrative 
discretion in law enforcement, have tended to rely upon rules to constrain 
discretion and have ignored the ability of rules alone to create it.  As we have 
seen, rule-based constraints on the scope of authority operate through 
transparent, prospective rules to limit a decision-maker’s discretion.  Rules 
 
362 The role that the “internalization” of norms plays in the theory may be illustrated by 
Tracey Meares’s distinction between justified and legitimate authority: legitimacy concerns 
the authority’s right to posit norms; justification concerns the agent’s personal morality.  
Meares, Legitimacy & Law, supra note 28, at 399; see also TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE 
OBEY THE LAW 3-4 (1990).  Justified authority is a “more powerful normative reason for 
compliance” than legitimate authority, Meares, Legitimacy & Law, supra note 28, at 399; 
Meares, supra note 55, at 410, presumably because justified authority is “internalized” as part 
of the agent’s personal morality whereas legitimate authority need not be.  “[T]he individual 
who complies for normative reasons does so because she feels an internal obligation to do 
so,” rather than on the basis of some external stimulus. Meares, Policing, supra note 15, at 
1616.  See also Meares, Social Organization, supra note 10, at 214 (compliance with norms 
based on agent’s internal perception of government legitimacy).  The manner in which 
Meares distinguishes legitimate from justified authority is substantially identical to the 
analytic description.  The concepts of legitimacy and justification are normative; they entail a 
particular, internal attitude on the part of the law’s subjects.  See, e.g., Meares, supra note 20, 
at 864-65; Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 670-80. 
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can, however, generate discretion in a variety of ways: more general norms 
tend to flatten nuances between different subjects or situations, including 
greater numbers of people within the scope of the norm;363 competing intra-
institutional norms may conflict, causing ambiguities in the scope of authority; 
social or other institutions norms may define the point and practice of an 
institutions norms in ways not contemplated by or in conflict with the 
institutional norms.   
 
As recognized in recent discussions of administrative systems: the 
administration of norms often departs significantly from the purposes 
contemplated during the legislative process not because there are too few 
norms controlling conduct, but too many.364 Where rule-based grants of 
authority are structured by a series of administrative norms that arise from 
executive custom or are enacted by the executive agency itself, the 
administrative official responds to executive rather than legislative or public 
regulations (if, indeed there are any available).  These may include the 
operating procedures regulating the day-to-day practice of the executive body, 
training manuals, and directives from senior to junior officials.365 Some may 
directly enforce legislative norms; others may have a less direct impact, 
channeling the resources and energies of the enforcement branch in ways that 
bolster or undermine legislative initiatives.  Other practices may be 
unsystematic and ad hoc, dependent upon the discretion of individual officials 
— police officers or prosecutors.366 In general, they will help to determine the 
official’s and the institution’s sense of its role and so determine the self-
conception of the scope of its authority: a self-conception that the public and 
courts may come to credit. 
 
As Debra Livingston argues, more and clearer legislative norms do nothing to 
alter the administrative discretion of law enforcement agencies.367 In part, this 
may be due to what Jamison Colburn has called the “cascading” effect of 
administrative regulations.368 The executive authority to interpret laws and 
 
363 From an anti-discrimination perspective, this may be a good thing; Meares certainly thinks 
that greater generality across groups has important consequences for signaling race-neutrality.  
See Meares, supra note 77, at 1344-49. 
364 See also Jamison E. Colburn, “Democratic Experimentalism”: A Separation of Powers for 
Our Time?, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 287, 335-42, 383-92 (2004). 
365 For some such body of rules, see Yale Kamisar, Remembering the “Old World” of 
Criminal Procedure: A Reply to Professor Grano, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 537 (1990) 
(discussing absence of rules of this type in pre-1960s New York State). 
366 See Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial 
Interventionism, 65 OHIO STATE L.J. 1479, 1561 (2004).  See also Colburn, supra note 364 at 
335-42, 383-92. 
367 See, e.g., Charles D. Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV.
1121 (2001) (discussing the manner in which police training led officers to violate suspects 
Miranda rights). 
368 Colburn, supra note 364 at 335-42, 383-92. 
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determine the manner of their enforcement generates a range of practices and 
procedures that may owe nothing to the purposes of the original legislation and 
everything to the administrative imperatives of the regulatory agency.369 The 
extant customs and traditions of the administrative institution, along with the 
agency’s interests in preserving its jurisdictional authority and internal 
hierarchy, render the impact of legislation less predictable and direct than 
might be imagined or desired.  All this is predictable given the concepts of 
social meaning and social influence integral to the social norms explanation of 
regulated intentional conduct. 
 
2. Policing Enforcement Practices and Externailization 
of Legal Norms 
 
Indeed, the executive branch may even adopt an “external” or “prudential” 
attitude to legislation as a means of increasing its discretion.  Rather than 
internalizing legislative norms as intrinsically or instrumentally worthwhile, 
the executive may be interested only in the range of sanctions consequent to 
violating the norms.  One interesting example of this is the New York City 
police force’s attitude to Supreme Court’s decision in Mapp v. Ohio,370 which 
applied the Fourth Amendment to the states.  As Yale Kamisar has explained, 
New York City Police Commissioner Michael Murphy’s reaction to the 
different legal standards pre- and post-Mapp offers a striking demonstration of 
the manner in which a rule determining the culpability and sanction for non-
conforming conduct may be regarded, from the external perspective, as a 
behavior-guiding rule.371 
Prior to Mapp, New York State had adopted a rule that prohibited illegal 
searches and seizures as a violation of civil and criminal law372 but permitted 
the prosecutor to use illegally seized evidence.373 The police commissioner 
considered that the pre-Mapp rule — which determined the consequences of 
unlawful conduct — could be used as a rule guiding that conduct.  This 
administrative refusal to internalize and apply legislative norms has a 
legitimacy cost: it undermines the relationship between state and citizen.374 
369 Id. 
370 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
371 See Kamisar, Defense, supra note 124; Kamisar, “Old World” Criminal Procedure, supra 
note 153 at 559.  Defore, 150 N.E. 585, established the New York State law on the 
admissibility of illegally seized evidence applicable prior to Mapp.
372 See Defore, 150 N.E. at 586-87 (“The officer might have been resisted, or sued for 
damages, or even prosecuted for oppression.  [Citation omitted]  He was subject to removal or 
other discipline at the hands of his superiors.  These consequences are undisputed.”). 
373 See Defore, 150 N.E. at 589. 
374 See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 166, at 667 (discussing importance of correspondence of 
police rules of conduct with community sentiment) (citing O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON 
LAW 41 (1938) “The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond 
with the actual feelings and demands of the community, right or wrong.”).   
ROLE-BASED POLICING 
61
The law as published precluded various forms of police conduct; the law as 
enforced applied a much different standard (the rule operated as a license 
rather than a prohibition).375 The transformation of prohibition into license is 
not part of the participative legislative process — in fact, it undermines it and 
replaces it with a set of non-public police tactics designed to frustrate the law.  
These illegitimate administrative procedures may even be ratified by 
legislative action or inaction where the legislature has the power to repeal the 
norms justifying the procedure.376 
Two recent Supreme Court cases, Chavez v. Martinez,377 and Missouri v. 
Seibert,378 demonstrate that the prudential attitude to norms is of current 
vintage and national impact.  Both cases arose from police violations of 
suspects’ Fifth Amendment Miranda rights; in both cases the police were 
trained or instructed to violate the suspects’ rights.  The executive, role-based, 
crime-control interest in obtaining the information trumped a proper 
understanding of Miranda v. Arizona379 as presenting a rule-based prohibition 
on non-consensual interrogations.380 Instead, a variety of state and federal 
law-enforcement training programs381 “disfigure[d]”382 the Court’s reasoning 
 
375 Note that the Fourth Amendment’s discussion of searches and seizures is framed as an 
express prohibition: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”  U.S. Const. 4th 
Adt. 
376 The Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, Kamisar has argued, attempts to restore that 
relationship through the “principled basis” of refusing to “‘ratify’ the unconstitutional police 
conduct that produced the proffered evidence, to keep the judicial process from being 
contaminated by partnership in police misconduct, and to assure the police and the public 
alike that the Court took the fourth amendment seriously.” Kamisar, supra note 153, at 560. 
377 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003). 
378 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004). 
379 384 U.S. 436 (1965). 
380 Despite the Court’s reiteration of the constitutional foundation of the warnings in 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).  See Missouri v. Seibert, Brief Amici Curiae 
of Former Prosecutors, Judges and Law Enforcement Officials, Supporting Respondent (filed 
October 8, 2003).  That brief was filed by former prosecutors, including Charles D. 
Weisselberg, Professor of Law at the University of California School of Law (Boalt Hall) 
Berkeley, and Stephen J. Schulhofer of NYU Law School’s Brennan Center for Justice.  In 
that brief, they pointed out that “[f]rom the outset, law enforcement officials have understood 
that Miranda's warning requirement applies directly to them. …No reasonable interpretation 
of th[e Court’s] language leaves any room to contend that the warnings are optional, not 
mandatory, or that they are anything other than binding upon police.  Id. at 5.  Furthermore, in 
his opinion respecting denial of sua sponte call for full court en banc rehearing in United 
States v. Orso, 275 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2001), Judge Stephen Trott, himself a former 
state and federal prosecutor, suggested a refusal to exclude “outside Miranda” interrogations 
would send a clear message to police trainers: “Don't advise, interrogate the suspect, violate 
the Constitution, use subtle and deceptive pressure, take advantage of the inherently coercive 
setting, and then, after the damage has been done, after the beachhead has been gained, gently 
advise the suspect of her rights.”  Id. 
381 See Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2608-09, 2609 n.2 (discussing training materials including Police 
Law Institute, Illinois Police Law Manual; California Commission on Peace Officer 
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in Oregon v. Elstad,383 treating that Court’s tort-style causation analysis 
instead as a prescription for how to avoid exclusion of un-Mirandized 
confessions.384 Indeed, one of the major worries identified by critics of the 
police procedures used in Seibert was the manner in which state and national 
training programs undermined local police guidelines or standards.   
 
Whether one regards the Elstad rule as a prohibition or permission upon un-
Mirandized interrogations depends upon factors internal to the police 
investigative role.  While such an executive transformation of legislative 
norms may be regarded by some as a perversion of the law, it may be regarded 
by others as justified given the exigencies of crime fighting.  For example, 
police training videos emphasized that the interrogation is often their “one 
shot” at solving serious crime.385 The Court’s finding of substantive 
 
Standards and Training, Video Training Programs for California Law Enforcement, Miranda: 
Post-Invocation Questioning (broadcast July 11, 1996); D. Zulawski & D. Wicklander, 
Practical Aspects of Interview and Interrogation 50-51 (2d ed.2002)).  See also Charles D. 
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 110, 132-139 (1998).   
382 Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2611. 
383 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
384 Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2612; see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 313 (1985).  Charles 
Weisselberg’s study of questioning “outside Miranda” provides an apt demonstration of the 
problem.   
A bulletin prepared by the Orange County, California District Attorney's 
office following Peevy described the state high court's characterization of 
“outside Miranda” questioning as illegal as “unfortunate dictum” that would 
“be open to serious dispute if [it] should ever form the basis of a ruling.”  
The bulletin continued: “Meanwhile, like they say down home, 'If you've 
caught the fish, don't fret about losing the bait.”  
Weisselberg, supra note 367, at 1143-44.  See also Cal. Att'ys for Crim. Justice v. Butts, 195 
F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 1999) (police officers regularly subverting Miranda pursuant to official 
policy set forth in training programs and materials); Chavez v. Martinez, No. 01-1444. Brief 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent 21 (filed October 25, 2002) (“California Supreme 
Court's disapproval of such conduct had little effect on police training”). 
385 Weisselberg provides an example of police training procedures in a video encouraging 
officers to interrogate “outside Miranda”: 
What if you've got a guy [in custody] that you've only got one shot at? This 
is it, it's now or never because you're gonna lose him--he's gonna bail out or 
a lawyer's on the way down there, or you're gonna have to take him over and 
give him over to some other officials--you're never gonna have another 
chance at this guy, this is it. And you Mirandize him and he invokes. What 
you can do — legally do — in that instance is go outside Miranda and 
continue to talk to him because you've got other legitimate purposes in 
talking to him other than obtaining an admission of guilt that can be used in 
his trial. … [Y]ou may want to go outside Miranda and get information to 
help you clear cases. … Or maybe it will help you recover a dead body or 
missing person. … You may be able to recover stolen property. … Maybe 
his statement will identify other criminals that are capering in your 
community. … Or, his statements might reveal the existence and location of 
physical evidence. You've got him, but you'd kinda like to have the gun that 
he used or the knife that he used. … [Y]ou go “outside Miranda” and take a 
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illegitimacy is supported by the collateral consequences of such interrogations: 
the “outside Miranda” practices followed by police and endorsed by some 
prosecutors had the effect — of which the police were apparently aware — of 
keeping defendants from testifying in their own defense for fear of 
impeachment.386 
C. Encounter and Escalation
A consequence of institutional deviation from general norms is that low-level 
criminal offences have a different “social meaning” for officers and for the 
local community. Low-level crimes serve as a gateway to investigating higher-
level crimes and policing tends to operate through technique of escalation.  In 
fact, the whole direction of policing under the Fourth Amendment is to use 
low-level encounters to engage the public, then progress through the stages of 
reasonable suspicion and probable cause to high-stakes interactions resulting 
in arrest.387 For New Chicago theorists, generally the point is to reorient 
policing, not solve crime.388 They therefore assume that the police will be 
willing to tolerate private crime so long as there is public order.   
 
Now, if public order policing works to reduce crime, it does so for one of two 
reasons: either because the same amount of crime now occurs in an orderly 
way in a private space; or because the people who would engage in public 
crime are caught or driven elsewhere.  If it is the latter, public order policing 
 
statement and then he tells you where the stuff is, we can go and get all that 
evidence.  
Weisselberg, supra note 381, at 110, 135-136. 
386 See id. at 110, 135-136 (police training video stated that questioning “outside Miranda”
“forces the defendant to commit to a statement that will prevent him from pulling out some 
defense and using it at trial — that he's cooked up with some defense lawyer — that wasn't 
true. So if you get a statement ‘outside Miranda’ and he tells you that he did it and how he did 
it or if he gives you a denial of some sort, he's tied to that, he is married to that.”)  
387 For an excellent example of the way this “routine” works in the context of traffic stops, see 
Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” From Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” 
Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1843 (2003-2004). 
388 That is certainly Tracey Meares’s orientation, see Meares, supra note 77, at 1347; Meares, 
Social Organization, supra note 10, at 224; at one point it appears to be Debra Livingston’s.  
See Livingston, Communities, supra note 10.  Livingston, however, seems most interested in 
investigative policing when discussing community caretaking.  See Livingston, Caretaking, 
supra note 10 at, 271-77.  Livingston could be making an argument about the standard by 
which to evaluate the reasonableness of intrusions upon privacy to engage in the caretaking 
role.  Such a discussion would properly implicate, not criminal cases, but civil cases for 
damages consequent to some tort of constitutional magnitude committed by the police when 
executing their caretaking function.  The standard for such a suit is high (shocks the 
conscience) and the police enjoy a certain degree of immunity, so such cases are infrequent.  
But civil infractions consequent to the severely negligent or intentionally maleficent 
performance of the caretaking function is not Livingston’s target.  Instead, she wants criminal 
investigation consequent to caretaking to be free from the warrant requirement.  Id. 
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works precisely because of the escalation effect: policing low-order crime 
enables high-stakes busts.  If it is the former, then what is required is that the 
police (who recognized through their preventative, public order encounters, 
that high-stakes crime is occurring) turn a blind eye to crime so long as it is 
private and orderly.  Debra Livingston suggests that the police tend to endorse 
the latter expectations. 
 
The importance of role-based constraints should now be obvious.  It is the 
conjunction of the War on Drugs’ punishment-oriented law enforcement with 
the police’s investigative role that is problematic, not discretion per se.  Social 
norms theories endorse a form of leveling down, not in the rates of policing 
but in the rates of arrest, prosecution, and incarceration, and believe the police 
and the public can be bought off by the gains in public order and perceptions 
of legitimacy.  So long as the police can separate their investigative from their 
preventative or caretaking roles, community policing will help create the trust 
relations upon which public order policing depends.   
 
Most worryingly for social norms theorists, not only law enforcement but also 
the court has chosen to understand the type of low-level encounters central to 
public-order policing as non-coercive and central to the investigatory process.  
Where social norms theorists seek to draw bright lines between the police’s 
investigative role on the one hand and its preventative or caretaking role on the 
other, both police and Court seek to fudge the issue.  In a series of cases 
concerned with traffic stops,389 the Court has removed a series of low-level 
encounters from the purview of the Fourth Amendment, and permitted the 
police to search and interrogate motorists and passengers in a manner that 
quickly escalates, via the “fiction” of consent, into high-stakes drug 
policing.390 In effect, such cases translated the rationale of Terry into the 
motor-vehicle context and permitted the vast range of low-level offenses, 
sufficient to render almost any use of a motor vehicle subject to police 
regulation,391 to operate as grounds for a variety of more or less invasive high-
stakes encounters with the police as part of the War on Drugs.  The whole 
point of public order policing is to enact a similar set of low-level offenses so 
as to expand the role of the police in community affairs.   
 
389 See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218; Mimms, 434 US 106; Bostick, 501 U.S. at 457-38; 
Ornelas, 517 U.S. 690; Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39-40. 
390 Sklansky, supra note 151, at 320-23.  See also DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE 
AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 27-34 (1999) (discussing consent 
searches); Cole, Discretion, supra note 8, at 1071-73. 
391 In the car stop situation it does not matter whether the initial infraction is civil or criminal, 
so long as the police have the power to detain the driver.  Compare Whren v. United States, 
517 U.S. 806 (1996) (temporary detention of motorist who the police have probable cause to 
believe has committed civil traffic violation is consistent with Fourth Amendment) with 
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (warrantless arrest for misdemeanor 
traffic offence is permissible under Fourth Amendment). 
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1. Role-Confusion and Escalation 
 
The police already perform a vast range of preventative functions in the 
community.  For example, Debra Livingston points out the difference between 
the police’s caretaking and investigative roles.392 The “caretaking 
functions”393 include: 
 
a wide range of everyday police activities undertaken to aid those in 
danger of physical harm, to preserve property, or “to create and 
maintain a feeling of security in the community.”  It includes things 
like the mediation of noise disputes, the response to complaints about 
stray and injured animals, and the provision of assistance to the ill or 
injured.  Police must frequently “care for those who cannot care for 
themselves: the destitute, the inebriated, the addicted . . . and the very 
young.”  They are often charged with taking lost property into their 
possession; they not infrequently see to the removal of abandoned 
property.  In those places where social disorganization is at its 
highest, police are even called upon “to serve as surrogate parent or 
other relative, and to fill in for social workers, housing inspectors, 
attorneys, physicians, and psychiatrists.”  Community caretaking, 
then, is an essential part of the functioning of local police.394 
The caretaking role, she claims, cannot and should not be regulated in the 
manner of the investigative role: rather, it concerns police intrusions that are 
generally supported by the community and which ought to be promoted so 
long as reasonable.  Although many of these activities intrude upon privacy 
rights protected by the Fourth Amendment, they are not motivated by an 
investigatory interest, and so should be measured by a substantially different 
set of assumptions.395 Livingston thus contends that the (rule-based) “warrant 
preference”396 is inapposite when measuring caretaking intrusion.397 
Livingston is, however, more ambivalent than Meares and Kahan about the 
separation of investigative and preventative roles.  Clearly, it is hard to draw a 
bright line between investigation and caretaking: nonetheless, so long as 
caretaking is properly motivated, Livingston argues, any investigative fruits 
are fair game for the police.398 In part, Livingston’s approach explains her 
rejection of broad based substantive laws, such as curfews, and demand for 
 
392 See Livingston, Caretaking, supra note 10. 
393 Cady v Dombrowski, 413 US 433, 441 (1973). 
394 Livingston, Caretaking, supra note 10, at 272. 
395 Id. at 265, 271. 
396 Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
197, 203-04 (1993) 
397 Livingston, Caretaking, supra note 10, at, 265-271. 
398 Livingston, Caretaking, supra note 10. 
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more targeted norms.  Livingston supports anti-gang loitering ordinances 
precisely because they narrowly target, not only the individuals to be policed, 
but also the officers who do the policing.399 In part, her approach demands a 
much greater transformation of police administration than that contemplated 
by Meares or Kahan, accompanied by a variety of mechanisms for oversight 
and reform.400 
Nonetheless, Livingston’s analysis of the caretaking role paradoxically 
demonstrates one of the strengths of the liberal legal rule-based approach: 
while it may not deter police conduct, it certainly operates to preclude some 
conduct from having legal effect.  From Mapp to Seibert, that has been the role 
of the exclusionary, rule-based approach to police action in excess of or 
contrary to their legitimate authority.  This rule-based approach serves to 
provide the hard separation of investigative from preventative policing 
required by the “trust and respect” perspective.  It is precisely the function of 
the warrant requirement to require the police, in certain circumstances, to take 
additional steps to move from one role to the other and so prohibit 
investigative windfalls from the caretaking role.401 
2. “No Neighborhood is an Island”402 
A further problem for the separation-of-roles requirement  is that localities are 
not hermetically sealed.  As the traffic enforcement context makes apparent, 
low-level policing is not geographically specific in the manner demanded by 
social norms theorists.  Meares critique of legal liberal “county level” 
solutions to local criminal justice problems403 is totally misplaced in the 
context of vehicle stops — and vehicles are precisely at the vanguard of drug 
policing and depend upon the use of low-level encounters.404 Just as the 
techniques used in traffic stops are transferable to pedestrians, so many 
pedestrians become the drivers of automobiles, or passengers in cars, buses, 
and trains.  Furthermore, it is in just these encounters — at the side of the road, 
on the bus, in the airport — that public self-reliance or autonomy from police 
pressure may be at its weakest.  It is here that the polite police “May I” is most 
likely to obtain grudging consent.405 
399 Livingston, Gang Loitering, supra note 13; Debra Livingston, Police Patrol, Judicial 
Integrity, and the Limits of Judicial Control, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1353 (1998). 
400 See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 27; Livingston, supra note 74. 
401 Furthermore, current law permits such windfalls where there is an investigative 
justification for invading privacy: either some independent source, Murray v. United States,
487 U.S. 533 (1988), or a showing that the evidence would inevitably have been discovered, 
Nix. v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
402 Fung, Beyond & Below, supra note 80, at 632. 
403 Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 688. 
404 David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth 
Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271 (1997). 
405 Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 276 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 289 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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The consent doctrine demonstrates the manner in which rule-based constraints 
upon authority can generate role-based social influence.  The police have a 
narrowly circumscribed authority to search individuals without a sufficient 
quantum of evidence to suspect criminal conduct.  But, by virtue of the 
generally compliant attitude of the general public, they wield a social influence 
in excess of their legal influence and so may induce consent against the 
suspect’s interest.   
 
A common explanation of consent to searches is in terms of lack of 
information backed by intimidation: the failure to alert citizens that they need 
not consent and are free to leave,406 combined with their generalized feelings 
of coercion during a police encounter, preclude citizens from asserting their 
rights.407 A complimentary explanation based on social influence would 
suggest that the public afford the officer a social authority that outstrips any 
granted by the law.  Court emphasis on the legal contours of the police role 
fudges the issue  of the legitimate scope of authority in these low-level 
encounters.  A focus on the acts of the police ignores the significance of the 
encounter for the civilian.  The Court’s emphasis on politeness in police 
conduct sidesteps the coercive ramifications of the encounter.   
 
Divergent social meanings of police politeness present significant problems 
for social norms descriptions of formally legitimate police conduct.  Politeness 
is a social-norms criterion of successful community policing.408 But if the 
polite police “May I” is in fact experienced by the public as intimidating — if, 
as Sklansky suggests, the idea of non-coercion is a “fiction” — then low-level 
policing is formally illegitimate.  If the targets of policing are not low-level 
crimes, but rather escalation to engage in high-stakes policing as part of the 
War on Drugs, then low-level policing is substantively illegitimate as well. 
 
The inevitable result is that minorities translate experiences of being pulled 
over for “driving while black” to local encounters with police.  In other words, 
disparate policing practices outside the neighborhood at the county, state, and 
national level can undercut minority perceptions of the government’s right to 
legislate criminal norms at the local level.409 So long as the channels of 
transportation are used to engage in the high-stakes policing associated with 
the War on Drugs, the disparate treatment of a minority community will 
continue to “undermine commitment to the law by minority law abiders by 
 
406 See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 151. 
407 See, id.; COLE, supra note 390. 
408 See Meares, Katyal & Kahan, supra note 215, at 1195, 1197; Meares, Legitimacy & Law, 
supra note 28, at 403. 
409 Meares, Policing, supra note 15, at 1616.  See also Meares, Social Organization, supra 
note 10, at 214. 
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fostering a perception of illegitimacy of government among members of the 
stigmatized minority group.”410 
Where the police conflate investigative and preventative roles, legal liberals 
tend to support cutting off the investigative role by rule-based constraints 
where possible, but mostly by diminishing the amount of policing received 
minority communities.  This is, however, to leave local communities under-
policed.  The social norms attempt to separate roles depends upon notions of 
local autonomy and transparent partnerships and “trust relationships” between 
the police and the community.  Experience and their own concepts of social 
meaning and social influence suggest, however, that national programs and 
institutional imperatives urging role-conflation and “escalating up” will trump 
local community norms. 
 
A different solution is to separate roles by differentiating the individuals and 
institutions responsible for public order and investigative policing.  Let the 
police engage in investigation and find another group without the personal or 
institutional motivation to conflate preventative with institutional roles.  To 
avoid the perception of under-policing, that group would have to be visible 
and associated with municipal or state governments; to engender trust and 
avoid the perception of over-policing, the group would have to have no role-
based investigative authority.  While there is no perfect solution to “the central 
question…: How can we reduce perceived bias without reducing the level of 
law enforcement in poor black communities?,”411 there are some candidates 
available to engage in the sort of precisely targeted policing of subjects and 
situations demanded by social norms theorists. 
 
VI. ROLE-BASED COMMUNITY POLICING
My proposal is to separate preventative policing focused on public order or 
quality of life issues from reactive investigative policing focused on 
apprehending criminals.  In contrast with liberal legal theories, I believe that 
police adherence to national or self-generated guides is no solution given the 
police tendency to translate norms from prohibitions to licenses, and to 
escalate low-level encounters into high-stakes interventions.  One of the Social 
Norm school’s fundamental insights is the transformative effect of our critical 
reflective attitude towards promulgated norms or regularly repeating 
phenomena.  The range of institutional imperatives structuring the law-
enforcement role decisively influences the attitude of the prosecutor or the 
police to social and legal norms. 
 
410 Meares, Place & Crime, supra note 5, at 678.  See also COLE, supra note 390 at 169-78 
(adopting a very “social norms” sounding rejection of police practices as undermining local 
perceptions of legitimacy). 
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In contrast to social norms theories, however, I suggest that encouraging 
“polite” interactions between police and public, and concentrating on low-
level substantive crimes is no alternative to the War on Drugs.  The police use 
precisely these encounters to engage in high-stakes policing, blurring the line 
between, on the one hand, preventative and caretaking roles and, on the other, 
investigative policing.  The courts are right to separate roles through the 
Fourth Amendment and deny the fruits of investigation to policing motivated 
by caretaking.412 That type of role-based separation cannot, however, be 
accomplished by rule-based limits on the scope of authority, as the police 
routinely engage in a range of encounters through which they utilize their 
social influence to avoid Fourth, and sometimes Fifth Amendment scrutiny. 
 
The solution to problems of urban policing is not — or not only — to equalize 
police tactics by policing upscale communities in the same manner as 
downscale ones.413 Nor is it simply to remove the police from urban 
communities.  To properly address the quality of life problems undermining 
community cohesion, municipalities must separate public order policing from 
investigative policing.  The police should continue to have authority to engage 
in investigation and detection of serious crime; however public order policing 
should be delegated to agents with limited authority to arrest or investigate and 
who have public order as his or her primary institutional goal.  Such 
individuals have neither the authority to use or interest in using criminal norms 
as a means of engaging in collateral policing of drug crimes. 
 
In what follows, I consider a range of public-municipal interactions to identify 
the type of municipal official able to engage in public order policing.  Some 
local communities already successfully negotiate the limits of policing, 
requiring the police to direct their activities to investigation, and partnering 
with local school, housing, and transportation authorities to remove the 
sources of public disorder.  Municipalities could, however, do more: 
reconstructing the activities of some local officials to engage in promoting 
public order.  
 
A. Municipal-Community Partnerships
The social norms literature is replete with discussions of partnerships between 
local communities, the police, municipal authorities, and private entities.  It is 
 
412 Livingston cites a number of Supreme Court and lower court opinions that take this 
position. See Livingston, Caretaking, supra note 10, at 301-03 (citing Skinner v Railway 
Labor Executives' Assn, 489 US 602, 619  (1989); O'Connor v Ortega 480 US 709, 721-725 
(1987); New Jersey v T.L.O., 469 US 325, 340 (1984); United States v Rohrig, 98 F3d 1506 
(6th Cir 1996); United States v Miller, 589 F2d 1117, 1125 (1st Cir 1978); Bies v State, 251 
NW2d 461, 468 (Wis 1977); Griffin v Wisconsin, 483 US 868, 873  (1987). 
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worth briefly recounting a couple to give an overview of the subjects and 
workings of such partnerships, if only to demonstrate that police activity is a 
relatively minor part of the order-restoring activity.  Most of public order 
policing turns out to require reclaiming and reconfiguring public spaces and 
avoiding the type of incident that would give rise to investigation through 
managing municipally controlled movements of people through public 
facilities or by public transportation.414 
The Chicago Bus Transfer Station, on the corner of 100th and Pullman Streets 
in Chicago, Illinois, was a crime hot-spot suffering from a gang problem 
exacerbated by the presence of students from a local high school.415 Disorder 
was particularly pronounced on days in which there had been fights at school.  
While the police provided a car to monitor the station, the real solution to the 
problem involved a partnership between parents, the Chicago Transport 
Authority, and the principal of the high school: the principal staggered class 
times to reduce pupil traffic, and the Transport Authority provided buses to 
bypass the Transfer Station and transport students directly to and from the high 
school.416 
In the Lake View neighborhood of Chicago, drug dealers used a sunken 
concrete pit in a local park at night to sell crack and engage in prostitution.417 
The residents initially encouraged more policing after dark — but over the 
longer term they remodeled the park, trimming the trees to make the interior 
more visible from the street, installing night lights, and redesigning the park to 
remove the pit and create a series of amenities more attractive to legitimate 
users.418 To effect the clean up and redesign of the park, residents enlisted the 
help of the “streets and sanitation department, the parks department, a friendly 
architect, private foundations, and local businesses.”419 Their efforts were 
overwhelmingly successful in reducing the illegal activity within the park.420 
Both these examples occurred in a city that has made great strides in reforming 
its police departments to promote local accountability at the neighborhood 
level.421 In other words, Chicago appears to have engaged in some of the 
reform that Livingston suggests is essential to constraining the police role.  
 
414 Fung, Beyond & Below, supra note 80, at 618-23. 
415 Id. at 625-27. 
416 Id. at 627. 
417 Id. at 627-29.  Fung describes an identical example in the “Lakeville” community in 
Chicago.  See FUNG, supra note 213, at 2.  I shall treat the two as, for present purposes, 
interchangeable. 
418 Id. at 628-9. 
419 FUNG, supra note 213, at 7. 
420 See Fung, Beyond & Below, supra note 80, at 628-9. 
421 Id. at 53-61, 63-68, 73-75, 79-86; see also See Fung, Beyond & Below, supra note 80, at 
618-21; Fung, Deepening Democracy, supra note 286 at 112-13. 
ROLE-BASED POLICING 
71
The Mayor’s Office and Chicago Police Department reorganized the police 
officers into “neighborhood-sized ‘beat teams,’” provided training for officers 
as part of a “striking” series of reforms directed at increasing partnerships with 
the local community, and required officers to engage in monthly meetings with 
local residents.422 As described by Archon Fung, a Harvard professor of 
public policy, the City had to engage in educating or re-educating, not only the 
police, but also the local community, hiring organizers “to knock on doors, 
post posters, contact community leaders, and call and facilitate meetings.”423 
Yet, as the two Chicago examples, above, make clear, better public-police 
relations are only part of the solution.   
 
Of particular importance to community order-maintenance efforts are 
problems resulting from “land use patterns and the ecological distributions of 
daily routine activities … The location of schools, the mix of residential with 
commercial land use (e.g., strip malls, bars), public transportation nodes, and 
large flows of nighttime visitors.”424 Recent studies of community disorder 
suggest both that links between crime and disorder are not so direct as some 
would suppose, and partnerships between police and communities, without 
more, are not the solution.425 If the police are not to transform public order 
policing to comport with their own priorities, then citizens must assume the 
dominant role in partnering process.  Many of the local responses to crime and 
disorder emphasize social relationships that require the police to act, if at all, 
in their traditional investigative role and engage in partnerships with other 
agencies as part of the process of prevention.  These include “‘graffiti 
patrols’ …; agitating for voting referendums to delicense bars where drug 
sales and disorder loom large [and t]he razing of a vacant ‘drug house’ by 
housing authorities.”426 
Quite aside from restructuring the administrative bureaucracy of the police in 
terms of public accountability, then, there exists an opportunity to emphasize 
municipal-public relationships other than those involving the police.  A range 
of municipal agencies are responsible for public order: education, 
transportation, and housing to name but three.  And they are involved in public 
order policing on two distinct levels: engaging in local, preventative 
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partnerships to respond to those situational factors that locate crime at various 
points in the neighborhood; and transmitting norms of law-abidingness across 
the community by responding to the low-level disturbances of public order 
within their jurisdiction. 
 
1. Private Policing: A Comparison 
 
A useful point of comparison is the type of private policing used for patrol in 
“wealthier neighborhoods . . . quasi-public spaces, such as shopping centers, 
all kinds of parking lots, and other private property open to the public.”427 
These private guards participate in limited policing — they are invited in by 
the relevant community to do their bidding, and they “possess no greater legal 
capabilities than do ordinary citizens to forcibly detain persons who are 
suspected of or have in fact committed a crime.”428 Rather than engaging in 
arrests and detentions the private police tend to “treat matters privately — 
banning, firing, and fining — instead of pursuing prosecution.”429 Finally, 
even in the realm of drug crime, so long as they perform the primary goals of 
preventing “loss” (the theft of commercial goods) or maintaining social order, 
other “kinds and amounts of deviance” may be tolerable.430 
For example, Elizabeth Joh provides, as an example of private policing, a 
Greyhound Bus Lines terminal in Tennessee, where the guards “routinely 
release persons who have been found with small amounts of drugs on their 
persons.”431 According to Joh,  “The public police were notified, according to 
the Greyhound guards, only when the quantity of drugs found warranted a 
felony charge.”432 Thus, precisely in the arena of drug policing, private police 
concerned with order-maintenance rather than investigation and escalation 
ignored low-level illegal drug possession in favor of controlling public order 
in their assigned locality. 
 
Private policing is thus, to an extent, a model of role-based limits on the 
promotion of public order.  Although private police enforcement practices may 
be completely transparent, they are certainly subject to social and economic 
pressures to engage in discipline of guards who do not treat the community 
 
427 Lawrence W. Sherman, Policing Communities: What Works?, in ALBERT J. REISS, JR. &
MICHAEL TONRY, EDS., COMMUNITY AND CRIME, 8 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF 
RESARCH 343, 372 (1986). 
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with some form of respect.433 Such police have a “demonstrably substantial” 
impact on norms of social conduct.434 “Private police keep people from 
drinking from bottles, arguing loudly, running around recklessly, or playing 
loud music.”435 They police precisely the sorts of disruptions of “routine 
activity”436 and specific locations — malls, schools, and transportation nodes 
— that are of particular concern to public order maintenance. 
 
Due to problems of cost and logistics, private policing may not be a solution 
for urban neighborhoods.  Furthermore, private police may send the wrong 
signal — that the neighborhood does not deserve or require public policing — 
so perpetuating historical perceptions of race and class based bias.  The task 
for municipalities, then, is to identify a range of municipal officials who can 
engage in the same type of policing as private security forces, focused on loss 
rather than harm,437 and bans and fines rather than arrests.  Such policing does 
not remove the police from the community, but does emphasize the public 
(and municipal official’s) role in calling upon the police, as well as redirecting 
policing resources to the dominant ones of response and investigation of 
crime. 
 
B. Municipal Institutions, Public Officials
A variety of municipal officials have engaged in activities that have a policing 
component, most recently as part of the “War on Terror.”438 Many of these 
officials work on buses and trains, in transportation terminals, or on the streets 
enforcing parking or littering ordinances.  In contrast to the police or private 
security officers, many of these public officials are residents of the 
communities in which they work, or travel so frequently through the 
community that they are identified with the particular neighborhoods in which 
they work.  Delegating increased responsibilities for policing public order 
reconstitutes such officials as norm entrepreneurs charged with signaling 
norms of public order to their peers within the community.  Furthermore, such 
municipal officials are able to communicate a powerful message — that 
quality-of-life issues matter and the government is taking it seriously — while 
simultaneously modeling appropriate norms of behavior in normatively 
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fragmented communities.  The community is thus encouraged to participate in 
the process of policing: members of the local community are encouraged to 
pick up their trash, scoop up after their dogs, not congregate in a threatening 
manner on street corners, keep the noise down, and obey consistent norms.   
 
Some recent empirical evidence supports this type of community self-reliance 
policing.439 Local norms of cooperation, especially directed at controlling the 
behavior and misbehavior of children, has a significant impact on public 
order.440 In addition to control of children in public places — at street corners 
with crossing guards, on public buses — these public officials can identify and 
address the familiar causes of urban blight: the abandoned cars, dumped trash, 
and broken windows that undermine the quality of life in fragmented urban 
communities.  While not a solution for every problem, such policing strikes 
the balance between ignoring the problem of public order and the worrisome 
effects of the War on Drugs. 
 
Thus, to consider the two examples of order-maintenance policing from 
Chicago, above: typical problem areas are bars, with the familiar problems of 
noisy, drunken behavior; transportation nodes, schools, and parks, which may 
be the site of anti-social gang activity441 or illegal activity such as drug 
dealing; and houses or business that provide a site contributing to public 
disorder.442 Problem activities include drug dealing, and staking out “turf” 
through “loitering” on street corners or “cruising” up and down neighborhood 
streets, intimidating local residents through public displays of gang activity or 
disrupting the peace in residential communities.  Some of these activities may 
be solved by redesign of the location of disorder, others by municipal 
employees enforcing of norms of order in schools, bus and train terminals, and 
parks.  While not a solution to every problem, certainly municipal authorities 
can organize areas and target infrastructure without engaging in dangerous 
interactions, and can alert police to where dangerous or violent disorder 
occurs. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION
The structural considerations that operate at the executive level require that, in 
executing the laws, the police and prosecutors treat not just individual agents 
but whole communities with respect.  The problem facing the police is their 
 
439 See, e.g. Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, Neighborhoods, supra note 81 at 918-924. 
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442 As a counterpoint, consider Fungs description of a laundry business that was used for drug 
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ROLE-BASED POLICING 
75
social and institutional distance from a particular community and the often-
hazardous settings in which they are required to interact with its most 
dangerous members.  Where social fragmentation is pronounced, there may be 
few individuals in authority and with social influence to whom they can appeal 
to participate in the norm-creating process.  From the other side of the 
equation, “the dwellers of the ghettos and the barrios of this land . . . view the 
policeman as ‘an occupying soldier in a bitterly hostile country.’”443 
“Normative” policing thus counsels at least moderation in the adversarial 
stance between police and community: adversarialism smacks of an attitude 
that is the antithesis of respect.  Especially so when the individuals at the sharp 
end of police practices — including those with social authority — may 
themselves engage in criminal and quasi-criminal activities and have a 
complex attitude to law-abidingness.444 Such problems are complex, and may 
require the use of the police and prosecutorial enforcement discretion.  
 
Escalation suggests that the problem of policing in minority communities is 
not too many police but too harsh policing.  Those who reject the legal liberal 
claim of “over-policing” may be right that more policing is required to restore 
or maintain order, but are wrong to suggest that police officers are best placed 
to engage in this preventative role.  “Over-policing,” in other words, has 
quantitative and qualitative dimensions, and each side in the debate shifts from 
number of police to type of policing depending upon which best supports their 
argument.   
 
My solution is a simple one: to prevent escalation by requiring officials other 
than the police to have primary responsibility for preventative policing.  That 
is not to deny the police a role in community policing, but to recognize that the 
police’s role is and should be secondary in the realm of public order.  High-
stakes escalation should be the last, and not the first resort, in poor 
communities as it is in better-off ones.  This program requires a moderate re-
allocation of resources and interests that empowers municipal officials at the 
same time as redirecting and sharpening the police investigative role. 
 
443 See Amsterdam, supra note 164 at 400. 
444 See Kahan & Meares, Crisis, supra note 1. 
